

Identification cards — Integrated circuit card programming interfaces — Part 4: Application programming interface (API) administration

ICS 35.240.15

National foreword

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A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its secretary.

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**Identification cards — Integrated circuit
card programming interfaces —**

Part 4:

**Application programming interface (API)
administration**

*Cartes d'identification — Interfaces programmables de cartes à puce —
Partie 4: Administration d'interface de programmation (API)*



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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO/IEC 24727-4 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 17, *Cards and personal identification*.

ISO/IEC 24727 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Identification cards — Integrated circuit card programming interfaces*:

- *Part 1: Architecture*
- *Part 2: Generic card interface*
- *Part 3: Application interface*
- *Part 4: Application programming interface (API) administration*
- *Part 5: Testing*
- *Part 6: Registration authority procedures for the authentication protocols for interoperability*

Introduction

ISO/IEC 24727 is a set of programming interfaces for interactions between integrated circuit cards (ICCs) and external applications to include generic services for multi-sector use. The organization and the operation of the ICCs conform to ISO/IEC 7816-4.

ISO/IEC 24727 is relevant to ICC applications desiring interoperability among diverse application domains. ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994 is used as the layered architecture of the client-application to card-application connectivity. That is, the client-application, through the application interface, assumes that there is a protocol stack through which it will exchange information and transactions among card-applications using commands conveyed through the message structures defined in ISO/IEC 7816. The semantics of action requests through the interface defined in ISO/IEC 24727-3 refers to application protocol data units (APDUs) as characterized through the interface defined in ISO/IEC 24727-2, and in the following International Standards:

- ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005, *Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange*
- ISO/IEC 7816-8:2004, *Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 8: Commands for security operations*
- ISO/IEC 7816-9:2004, *Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 9: Commands for card management*

The goal of ISO/IEC 24727 is to maximize the applicability and solution space of software tools that provide application interface support to card-aware client-applications. This effort includes supporting the evolution of card systems as they become more powerful, peer-level partners with existing and future applications while minimizing the impact to existing solutions conforming to ISO/IEC 24727.

By conforming to this part of ISO/IEC 24727, interoperable implementations of ISO/IEC 24727-3 and ISO/IEC 24727-2 can be realized. Implementation details are not defined within this part of ISO/IEC 24727; it is assumed that an implementation conforms to an accepted security policy. The specific security policy is outside the scope of ISO/IEC 24727.

Identification cards — Integrated circuit card programming interfaces —

Part 4: Application programming interface (API) administration

1 Scope

ISO/IEC 24727 defines a set of programming interfaces for interactions between integrated circuit cards and external applications to include generic services for multi-sector use.

This part of ISO/IEC 24727 standardizes the connectivity and security mechanisms between the client-application and the card-application.

It specifies API-Administration of service-independent and implementation-independent ISO/IEC 24727 compliant modules, including security, that enables action requests to a specific card-application of an ICC such that, when coupled to data model and content discovery operations, the card-application can be used by a variety of client-applications.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005, *Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange*

ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999, *Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher*

ISO/IEC 24727-1, *Identification cards — Integrated circuit card programming interfaces — Part 1: Architecture*

ISO/IEC 24727-2, *Identification cards — Integrated circuit card programming interfaces — Part 2: Generic card interface*

ISO/IEC 24727-3, *Identification cards — Integrated circuit card programming interfaces — Part 3: Application interface*

IETF RFC 2246, *The TLS Protocol Version 1.0*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 24727-1, ISO/IEC 24727-2, ISO/IEC 24727-3 and the following apply.

- 3.1**
channel
physical pathway allowing movement of information bits between a client-application and a card-application
- 3.2**
component
executable code comprising a processing layer accessed with ISO/IEC 24727 defined application programming interfaces
- 3.3**
confidentiality
access restricted to some defined level of differential-identity authentication
- 3.4**
dubious-channel
channel that might allow information messages to be altered, dropped, replayed or overheard by eavesdroppers
- 3.5**
instantiation
operational component implementation or communication channel implementation
- 3.6**
integrity
state of immutability of information
- 3.7**
ISO/IEC 24727 protocol stack
series of processing components connected by communication channels that connect a client-application to a card-application
- 3.8**
loyal-channel
channel that intrinsically maintains the integrity of channel end-points along with the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information
- 3.9**
loyal-platform
computing platform that is trusted to perform data transformations and communication while maintaining confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information
- 3.10**
loyal-stack
ISO/IEC 24727 stack in which the full stack from client-application to the integrated circuit card that contains the card-application is implemented on a single loyal-platform
- 3.11**
path-protection-policy
specification of the security characteristics of all platforms and channels using ISO/IEC 24727 that connect the client-application to the card-application

3.12

proxy

application programming interface implementation that conveys action requests and parameters to a layer implementation located elsewhere

3.13

TC_API

application programming interface used by components of an ISO/IEC 24727 stack to effect the stack's instantiation in a network environment

3.14

trusted-channel

channel that explicitly assures the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information during the transfer process, independent of the characteristics of the transfer mechanism or media

3.15

trusted-path

connection between a client-application and a card-application in which all platforms and channels have security characteristics as defined by the client-application

4 Abbreviated terms

TLS	-	transport layer security
CC	-	cryptographic checksum
CG	-	cryptogram
D	-	decipher
DES	-	data encryption standard
DO	-	data object
E	-	encipher
K	-	key
Le	-	expected length
MAC	-	message authentication code
SSC	-	send sequence counter
API	-	application programming interface
APDU	-	application protocol data unit

5 Architecture specialization

ISO/IEC 24727-1, ISO/IEC 24727-2 and ISO/IEC 24727-3 define an architecture, application programming interface and a command-set communication message structure and protocol through which a client-application can access information and computation services from a card-application. The objective of ISO/IEC 24727 is to achieve interoperability among diverse implementations of card-applications and client-applications. ISO/IEC 24727-1 specifies the overarching architecture of ISO/IEC 24727. ISO/IEC 24727-2 specifies a generic request set through which card-application services may be accessed. ISO/IEC 24727-3 specifies the application interface through which client-applications shall access services provided by card-applications. The architectural overview of ISO/IEC 24727 as illustrated in Figure 1 envisions a variety of implementations that can satisfy the standard in sufficient detail to successfully conform to the testing procedures which will be specified in ISO/IEC 24727-5.




Figure 1 — Specialization of the ISO/IEC 24727 Architecture

This part of ISO/IEC 24727 details the stack instantiation and operational procedures that provide for the preparation and use of a card-application to provide information storage, retrieval and associated processing for client-applications.

This part of ISO/IEC 24727 does not mandate a specific implementation methodology, but it does provide a detailed definition of information organization and content to be supported by any conformant implementation. An ISO/IEC 24727 conformant stack shall instantiate at least one of the configurations defined in Clause 5.

This clause specifies a variety of instantiation configurations of the ISO/IEC 24727 protocol stack. The spectrum of configurations range from the full-network-stack to the loyal-stack. The opaque-ICC-stack is a

configuration in which the ISO/IEC 24727-2 instantiation shall be tightly coupled to the card-applications that it can support; tightly coupled meaning that the connection to the card-application containing ICC through operating system specific code for accessing an interface device is encompassed by the ISO/IEC 24727-2 instantiation. The remote-loyal-stack considers a configuration in which a loyal-stack shall be utilized on a platform that is remote from the client-application. The ICC-resident-stack considers a card-application that shall support the ISO/IEC 24727-3 layer implementation. Finally, the remote-ICC-stack discusses a stack in which the physical connection of the ICC shall be made to a different platform from the rest of the stack.

It is noted that all parts of ISO/IEC 24727 are neutral with respect to the physical interconnection mechanism used to complete a communication channel(s) from the client-application to the card-application. Consequently, references to ICC should be interpreted as being equally applicable to PICC or to non-card resident card-applications and that references to IFD are equally applicable to PCD or other card-application containing platform interfaces.

Figure 2 illustrates the generic elements of an ISO/IEC 24727 protocol stack.





Figure 2 — Generic Elements of the ISO/IEC 24727 Stack

These elements define a general stack configuration. This general stack configuration allows a full ISO/IEC 24727 compliant stack to be segmented across a range of one to four distinct computer platforms. In Figure 2, these platforms are designated as Platform 1, 2, 3 & 4 respectively.

In a fully segmented stack, four distinct communication channels are required to connect the components that comprised the stack. These channels are designated as Channel 1, 2, 3 & 4 respectively. In Clause 5.1 through Clause 5.6, six distinct stack configurations are specified. These comprise the set of allowed ISO/IEC 24727 conformant stacks. A conformant ISO/IEC 24727 stack instantiation shall encompass at least one of these six stack specifications. A conformant ISO/IEC 24727 stack instantiation may encompass more than one of these six stack configurations.

Figure 3 provides a descriptive legend to be used in interpreting the details of the remaining figures in Clause 5.



A proxy and agent pair (of processes) allow the extension of an API from one point in a stack to a different point by conveying the action requests and associated parameters through a standard description; a procedure known as "marshalling".

5.1 Full-network-stack

A general interconnection between a client-application and a card-application allows each component of the stack to be connected to its adjacent components by way of a network connection, as illustrated in Figure 4.

The full-network-stack configuration of ISO/IEC 24727 entails a segmentation of the ISO/IEC 24727 stack into its interoperable constituent components. While it may be unlikely that such a stack configuration shall be used in a routine operational setting, by testing conformance of this configuration, a fine level of granularity of component interoperability can be confirmed.

Realization of a full-network-stack shall be effected through static network configurations of the various components. Dynamic process invocation of the components is not required by ISO/IEC 24727. The establishment of end-to-end security characteristics shall be effected through parameters passed through the ISO/IEC 24727-3 API. Stack instantiation and operation may subsequently entail out-of-band parameter passing with respect to the ISO/IEC 24727-2 interface, particular in establishing the appropriate keys to enable subsequent secure messaging between the ISO/IEC 24727-2 layer implementation and the card-application.

Corresponding stack establishment and connection (and session) security characteristics establishment shall be met by instantiations of all other stack configurations specified in the various sub-clauses of Clause 5.




Figure 4 — Networked Connections Between Client-Application and Card-Application

In Figure 4, the client-application to SAL-API proxy connection is effected by a loyal-channel. All other communication channels indicated in the figure are dubious-channels. If the path-protection-policy invoked by the client-application specifies an increased level of security beyond a dubious-channel for any communication channel, then this level shall be achieved through the use of trusted-channels or, if applicable, through the use of secure messaging.

The ISO/IEC 24727-3 implementation, ISO/IEC 24727-2 implementation and card broker implementations all comprise components that shall be effected on trusted platforms if the entire stack is to be viewed as a secure category beyond a level of intrinsic security and discussed in Clause 6.

5.2 Loyal-stack

As illustrated in Figure 5, a loyal-stack is an implementation of the complete ISO/IEC 24727 stack on a loyal-platform, hence using loyal-channels for all connections except for any connection to an ICC via an interface device. For the operating system specific interface device API layer, an enhanced security category shall be achieved for communication via the interface device to the card-application through the use of secure messaging.





Figure 5 — Proprietary Implementations of ISO/IEC 24727-2 & ISO/IEC 24727-3 Layers

A loyal-stack shall effect either an intrinsic path-protection-policy category, as defined in Clause 6, or be completely instantiated in a loyal environment with the only possible dubious-channel being the connection of the stack to the card-application via an interface device using secure messaging as noted above. The use of the TC_API is not mandatory when running a secure channel within a Loyal Stack.

5.3 Opaque-ICC-stack

An opaque-ICC-stack incorporates the ISO/IEC 24727-2 layer instantiation and the interface device layer instantiation into a single component. This component encompasses the operating system specific connection via an interface device with the card-application. This component shall exist as a static network accessible process in which its trusted-channel layer shall present itself as the server component (see IETF RFC 2246) in the negotiation of a trusted-channel.



Stack Configuration

Figure 6 — Opaque ICC Stack

The keys through which to effect secure messaging between the ISO/IEC 24727-2 layer instantiation and the card-application shall be obtained through the procedural element invoked during the ISO/IEC 24727-2 layer's bootstrap operation as specified in ISO/IEC 24727-2.

5.4 Remote-loyal-stack

A remote-loyal-stack segments a loyal-stack into two distinct components, allowing the client-application to be displaced on a network from its supporting ISO/IEC 24727 stack and the card-application with which it communicates. An SAL-API proxy component is directly linked to the client-application and this proxy communicates through a trusted-channel with the remainder of the loyal-stack as illustrated in the Figure 7.





Figure 7 — Remote-loyal-stack

The ISO/IEC 24727-3 layer and ISO/IEC 24727-2 layer component shall exist as a static network accessible component at the time the remote-loyal-stack is instantiated by action from the client-application. This component shall exist as a static network accessible process in which its trusted-channel layer shall present itself as the server component (see IETF RFC 2246) in the negotiation of a trusted-channel with the client-application component.

5.5 ICC-resident-stack

An ICC-resident-stack provides the complete ISO/IEC 24727 stack instantiation within a card-application. The only off-card components are the SAL-API-Proxy and the interface device layer which provide syntactic, semantic and physical connectivity between the client-application and the card-application as illustrated in Figure 8. As illustrated in Figure 8, either of two distinct paths can be used in conveying the marshalled API to the client application. The appropriate path is determined through the addressing returned to the client-application by the CardApplicationPath request defined in ISO/IEC 24727-3.



The card-application's trusted-channel layer instantiation shall exist as a static network accessible component at the time the ISO/IEC 24727 stack is instantiated through action by the client-application. This component shall exist as a static network accessible process in which its trusted-channel layer shall present itself as the server entity (see IETF RFC 2246) in the negotiation of a trusted-channel with the client-application component. Support of TLS by the ICC is not defined by ISO/IEC 7816. The marshalled elements of the SAL API may also be conveyed to the card-application encapsulated within an ENVELOPE apdu as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 and as indicated in Figure 8.

5.6 Remote-ICC-stack

Figure 9 illustrates a remote-ICC-stack. In this configuration, the full ISO/IEC 24727 stack is implemented on the same platform as the client-application. The physical connection point of the card-application may be present on a different platform from the client-application with a trusted-channel providing connectivity between the two components of the complete stack.




Figure 9 — Remote-ICC-Stack

In this configuration, the interface device API layer instantiation shall exist as a static network accessible component at the time of stack instantiation by action of the client-application. This component shall exist as a static network accessible process in which its trusted-channel layer shall present itself as the server entity (see IETF RFC 2246) in the negotiation of a trusted-channel with the client-application component.

6 Security architecture

Instantiation of a card-application, including the access control rules used within the card-application to secure information storage and computational process access, shall be effected by a client-application through the ISO/IEC 24727-3 API or by a completely functionally equivalent procedure. Connection to an ISO/IEC 24727 stack shall be effected by a client-application through the ISO/IEC 24727-3 API. Stack configurations to be accessed by a client-application shall be instantiated prior to access by a client-application. Security characteristics of any stacks made available shall be conveyed from the ISO/IEC 24727-3 layer to the client-application through the ISO/IEC 24727-3 API CardApplicationPath request response. It shall be the prerogative of the client-application to select the acceptable stack configuration that provides access to the desired card-application. Clause 6.1 defines the semantics to be used to describe the stack security characteristics.

6.1 Path-protection-policy

A conformant ISO/IEC 24727 stack shall effect a communication channel between a client-application and a card-application via intermediate stack components. As illustrated in Figure 2, these components and adjacent channels comprise several discrete segments. Each of these segments shall be based on a variety of

communication mechanisms, each with its own specific set of protocols specified by the stack configuration. Accordingly, the security characteristics accorded the information flowing between the client-application and the card-application shall be constrained to the (security) mechanisms specified through the path-protection-policy established for each stack configuration. The only points of channel access, regardless of stack configuration, shall be the client-application and the card application. The specification of the path-protection-policy shall be conveyed to the client-application through the ISO/IEC 24727-3 API as a parameter of the CardApplicationPath request of the Connection Service.

The coherence of the security characteristics of the communication channel between the client-application and the card-application shall be characterized by a path-protection-policy-class that shall determine the granularity of security mechanisms used to effect the channel according to the following definitions:

Path-protection-policy-classes

- end-to-end - a single key or key set shall be used to secure the channel between the client-application and the card-application.
- segmented - different keys or key sets shall be used to secure the various segments of the channel between the client-application and the card-application.
- agnostic - no specification is given for the security characteristics of the channel between the client-application and the card-application; the strength or weakness of the security characteristics of the channel is immaterial.

Within a specific path-protection-policy-class, various categories of security shall be established by a stack configuration according to the path-protection-policy-category. The path-protection-policy-category determines the specific security-facets that shall be achieved by the stack configuration and, implicitly, the mechanisms that shall be used to effect these facets, according to the following definitions

Path-protection-policy-categories

- Intrinsic - result of platform + channel default facets
- Protected - confidentiality + data integrity
- Source-authenticated - card-application authentication + Protected
- Mutually-authenticated - card-application authentication + Source-authenticated + Protected

The card-application authentication and the Source-authenticated path-protection-policy-categories shall be effected through the ISO/IEC 24727-3 CardApplicationStartSession request.

The security features to be established according to path-protection-policy-categories, and the implicit mechanisms that may be used to effect these security-facets, are defined as follows:

Characteristics & Mechanisms

- confidential – eavesdropping prevented across the specific channel segment (mechanisms)
 - confidential-trusted-channel
 - loyal-platform
 - loyal-channel
- data integrity – data integrity maintained across the specific channel segment (mechanisms)
 - MAC-trusted-channel
 - loyal-platform
 - loyal-channel
- source integrity – authentication of differential-identity used to access information (mechanisms)
 - client-application authentication (internal-auth)
 - client-application authentication (external-auth)

Due to the composition of the various stack configurations, not all path-protection-policy-classes are available on all configurations. Table 1 illustrates the most stringent classes that can be achieved on the various stack configurations defined in Clause 5.

Stack Configuration	Protected	Client-Source	Mutual-Auth
Loyal	end-to-end	end-to-end	end-to-end
Full-Network	segmented	segmented	segmented
Opaque-ICC	segmented	segmented	segmented
Remote-Loyal	segmented	segmented	segmented
ICC-Resident	end-to-end	end-to-end	segmented
Remote-ICC	end-to-end	end-to-end	segmented

Table 1 — Path-protection-policy-classes per category per stack configuration

In Table 1, "protected" refers to the establishment of data privacy (meaning protection from eavesdroppers) and data integrity (meaning protection from any change in data values) within the various stack configurations. "Client-source" refers to the establishment of an authentication state between the client-application and the card-application or between the card-application and the client-application. "Mutual-auth" refers to the simultaneous establishment of authentication states in both the client-application and the card-application. Each element of the table indicates the highest level of path-protection-policy-class that can be achieved for a specific path-protection-policy-category through a specific type of stack configuration.

Establishing a path between a client-application and a card-application is achieved by the client-application selecting an acceptable stack configuration that is included as one element the available path(s) returned by the CardApplicationPath request and then performing a CardApplicationConnect request to establish a connection to the card-application. More stringent security characteristics can then be established by performing a CardApplicationStartSession with the desired authentication protocol specified.

6.2 ACL – ACR mapping

All access rules defined by access control lists shall be enforced by any conformant ISO/IEC 24727-3 layer implementation. It is expected that such enforcement will be accomplished by establishing access rules within the card-application using mechanisms presented by an ISO/IEC 24727-2 layer implementation. This does not preclude these AR enforcement mechanisms from being augmented by on-ICC or on-PICC mechanisms where available.

6.3 Secure messaging

Any path-protection-policy that references secure messaging shall use Annex A mechanisms. Secure messaging shall use common keys at each terminus of the secure messaging pathway in order to compute the necessary cryptograms required by the Annex A mechanisms. Secure messaging can only be implemented at the point within the stack at which all communication with the card-application has been reduced to ISO/IEC 7816-4 compliant APDUs. This point is realized within either the ISO/IEC 24727-3 layer implementation or the ISO/IEC 24727-2 layer implementation. In order to effect secure messaging, common keys shall be available at this point as well as within the card-application. The key(s) used to effect secure messaging within an ISO/IEC 24727-2 layer instantiation may either be intrinsic to the layer or derived by the procedural elements during the bootstrap operation defined in ISO/IEC 24727-2. The key(s) used to effect secure messaging within an ISO/IEC 24727-3 layer instantiation shall be provided by the client-application directly, or through the successful execution of an appropriate authentication protocol.

Any conformant ISO/IEC 24727-2 layer instantiation that presents a capability to perform secure messaging shall reside on a loyal-platform.

When an APDU is protected by secure messaging, it may be transmitted as such at the GCI according to ISO/IEC 24727-2, or as an argument of a REQUEST or CONFIRMATION at the IFD-API.

6.4 Trusted-channel key administration

Security derived from the use of a trusted-channel shall be independent of any secure messaging, or of any application-to-application security mechanisms used via the ISO/IEC 24727-3 session between a client-application and a card-application. The trusted-channel encryption mechanisms, including all key administration, shall be independent of any differential-identity mechanisms used within a card-application.

7 Connection components

The general architecture defined in ISO/IEC 24727-1 identifies a number of discrete components that can be accessed through interfaces specified by the ISO/IEC 24727 standard.

All ISO/IEC 24727 conformant interfaces shall be uniquely identified through the version numbers established by the ASN.1 specifications of the interfaces.

7.1 Action request and response semantics

All stack requests from the ISO/IEC 24727-3 API to the card-application shall occur synchronously.

7.2 Proxy – Agent Architecture

ISO/IEC 24727-3 defines an extensible API, the Service Access Layer API, through which a client-application shall derive services from a remotely located card-application. This API may be instantiated as a component forming a proxy that shall be directly linked to the client-application through a language specific binding based on the implementation language of the client-application. In a similar fashion, the IFD API defined in Clause 7 can also be implemented through a standard proxy – agent facility as illustrated in Figure 10.




Figure 10 — Proxy – Agent Facilities

As indicated in the figure, the functions of the SAL-API proxy shall be to (a) provide a language specific binding of the ISO/IEC 24727-3 API for direct linkage to the client-application, (b) marshal all aspects of the ISO/IEC 24727-3 API into an ASN.1 data stream, and (c) project this data stream into the ISO/IEC 24727 stack through a trusted- channel. This trusted-channel allows the data stream to be delivered to any other stack component at any location on the network. Since this delivery is done through a trusted-channel, the security of the overall ISO/IEC 24727 stack is maintained by this component. In appropriate stack configurations, similar facilities can be used for the IFD API.

7.3 Trusted-channel Interface

ISO/IEC 24727-1 defines an architecture that allows for various components of the ISO/IEC 24727 protocol stack to be distributed across a wide-area network connection between a client-application and a card-application. This clause defines an API that shall be used by various components to effect a connection across a general network. This API shall provide access to communication facilities through the various trusted channel protocols identified in Annex A.2. A conformant ISO/IEC 24727 stack configuration that uses a trusted channel established through this API shall support at least the TLS protocol as specified in IETF RFC 2246.

API Function	Functional Description
TC_API_Open	This function initiates the handshake through which the client and server orientation is established between the two ends of the channel and through which the security characteristics of the channel are established.
TC_API_Close	This function terminates the trusted-channel.
TC_API_Write	This function transfers a message through the trusted-channel to the terminus point at the other end of the trusted-channel.
TC_API_Read	This function accepts a message from the trusted-channel.
TC_API_Reset	This function flushes any pending messages in the trusted-channel and re-initialises the trusted-channel.
TC_API_GetStatus	This function retrieves the current status of the trusted-channel, including the status of any pending messages in the trusted-channel.

Table 2 — Trusted Channel API

7.3.1 TC_API_Open request

7.3.1.1 Purpose

The TC_API_Open request initiates the trusted-channel handshake phase.

7.3.1.2 Action

OUT	status_code	TC_API_Open (
IN	octet string	remoteAddress,
IN	octet string	channelParams,
OUT	struct_handle	channelHandle
		);

7.3.1.3 Parameters

remoteAddress	address of remote channel node
channelParams	security and connection parameters including an OID to designate the specific protocol as defined in Annex A
channelHandle	opaque handle for the opened channel

7.3.1.4 Prerequisites

NONE

7.3.1.5 Return codes

API_OK
API_TIMEOUT_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_ERROR
API_NODE_NOT_REACHABLE

7.3.1.6 Impact on current state

On successful completion, a bi-directional channel will be established to the specified remote network address.

7.3.2 TC_API_Close request

7.3.2.1 Purpose

The TC_API_Close request terminates the trusted-channel.

7.3.2.2 Action

OUT	status_code	TC_API_Close (
IN	struct_handle	channelHandle
		);

7.3.2.3 Parameters

channelHandle	handle of the currently open channel
---------------	--------------------------------------

7.3.2.4 Prerequisites

NONE

7.3.2.5 Return codes

API_OK
API_TIMEOUT_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_HANDLE

7.3.2.6 Impact on current state

On successful completion of this request, the currently open channel will be closed.

7.3.3 TC_API_Read request

7.3.3.1 Purpose

The TC_API_Read request retrieves a message from the trusted-channel.

7.3.3.2 Action

OUT	status_code	TC_API_Read(
IN	struct_handle	channelHandle,
OUT	octet string	message
		);

7.3.3.3 Parameters

	channelHandle	opaque handle of the open channel
channel	message	buffer containing the message read from

7.3.3.4 Prerequisites

NONE

7.3.3.5 Return codes

API_OK
API_TIMEOUT_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_ERROR
API_WARNING_BUFFER_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
API_UNKNOWN_HANDLE

7.3.3.6 Impact on current state

On the successful completion of this request, the buffer "message" contains a series of bytes read from the open channel.

7.3.4 TC_API_Write request

7.3.4.1 Purpose

The TC_API_Write request places a message structure into the trusted-channel.

7.3.4.2 Action

OUT	status_code	TC_API_Write (
IN	struct_handle	channelHandle,
IN	octet string	message
		);

7.3.4.3 Parameters

channelHandle	opaque handle to the open channel
message	buffer containing string of bytes

7.3.4.4 Prerequisites

NONE

7.3.4.5 Return codes

API_OK
API_TIMEOUT_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_HANDLE

7.3.4.6 Impact on current state

On successful completion of this request, the message buffer has been written to the channel.

7.3.5 TC_API_Reset request

7.3.5.1 Purpose

The TC_API_Reset request purges any pending messages in the trusted-channel and reinitialises the channel to a “post-handshake” state.

7.3.5.2 Action

OUT	status_code	TC_API_Reset (
IN	struct_handle	channelHandle
		);

7.3.5.3 Parameters

channelHandle	opaque handle for the open channel
---------------	------------------------------------

7.3.5.4 Prerequisites

NONE

7.3.5.5 Return codes

API_OK
API_TIMEOUT_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_HANDLE

7.3.5.6 Impact on current state

On successful completion of this request, the channel is in the immediate post-handshake state with no pending messages.

7.3.6 TC_API_GetStatus request

7.3.6.1 Purpose

The TC_API_GetStatus request returns the current state of the trusted-channel.

7.3.6.2 Action

OUT	status_code	TC_API_GetStatus (
IN	struct_handle	channelHandle,
OUT	octet string	statusString
		);

7.3.6.3 Parameters

channelHandle	opaque handle for the open channel
statusString	current state of the channel

7.3.6.4 Prerequisites

NONE

7.3.6.5 Return codes

API_OK
API_TIMEOUT_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_ERROR
API_UNKNOWN_HANDLE

7.3.6.6 Impact on current state

On successful completion of this request, the current state of the open channel is returned in the statusString parameter.

7.4 Interface Device API

The Interface Device API comprises the following group of requests, which are specified in a generic manner:

- Slot terminal related requests
- Slot related requests
- User related requests

Slot terminal related requests

The Interface Device API contains the following slot terminal related requests:

- EstablishContext
- ReleaseContext
- ListIFDs
- GetIFDCapabilities
- GetStatus
- Wait
- Cancel
- ControllIFD

Slot related requests

The Interface Device API contains the following slot related functions:

- Connect
- Disconnect
- BeginTransaction
- EndTransaction
- Transmit

User related requests

The Interface Device API contains the following user related requests:

- VerifyUser
- ModifyVerificationData
- Output

The Interface Device API defined in this clause shall only be accessed from within a SAL layer or a GCI layer. If the return code from any action request is different from IFD_OK, then output parameters may be absent or not correctly set.

7.4.1 Establish Context

A slot terminal related request.

7.4.1.1 Purpose

The `EstablishContext` request creates a context through which further commands can be sent to the IFD-Layer.

7.4.1.2 Action

OUT	Status	EstablishContext (
IN	ChannelHandleType	ChannelHandle OPTIONAL,
OUT	ContextHandleType	ContextHandle
		) ;

7.4.1.3 Parameters

`ChannelHandle` is an optional parameter, which may be used to address an established channel to a remote system. The `ChannelHandle` is obtained using the function `TC_API_Open` defined in ISO/IEC 24727-4. If the call is addressed to the local system the parameter `ChannelHandle` may be omitted.

`ContextHandle` is the returned handle which may be used in other calls to address the established context with the IFD-Layer.

7.4.1.4 Return Codes

<code>IFD_OK</code>	The request was successful.
<code>IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR</code>	The request timed out before completion.
<code>IFD_INVALID_CHANNEL_HANDLE</code>	The provided <code>ChannelHandle</code> is invalid.
<code>IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR</code>	There was some unknown error.

7.4.2 ReleaseContext

A slot terminal related request.

7.4.2.1 Purpose

The `ReleaseContext` request releases an established context with the IFD-Layer.

7.4.2.2 Action

OUT	Status	ReleaseContext (
IN	ContextHandleType	ContextHandle
		);

7.4.2.3 Parameters

`ContextHandle` is the handle to the context which shall be released.

7.4.2.4 Return Codes

IFD_OK	The request was successful.
IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR	The request timed out before completion.
IFD_INVALID_CONTEXT_HANDLE	The provided ContextHandle is invalid.
IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR	There was some unknown error.

7.4.3 ListIFDs

A slot terminal related request.

7.4.3.1 Purpose

The ListIFDs request returns a list of currently available Interface Devices (IFD) on the platform.

7.4.3.2 Action

OUT	Status	ListIFDs (
IN	ContextHandleType	ContextHandle,
OUT	string	IFDName[]
		);

7.4.3.3 Parameters

ContextHandle addresses the established context with the IFD-Layer.

IFDName is the unique name of the IFD, which is used to address the specific IFD.

7.4.3.4 Return Codes

IFD_OK	The request was successful.
IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR	The request timed out before completion.
IFD_INVALID_CONTEXT_HANDLE	The provided ContextHandle is invalid.
IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR	There was some unknown error.

7.4.4 GetIFDCapabilities

A slot terminal related request.

7.4.4.1 Purpose

The `GetIFDCapabilities` request returns information about the capabilities of a specific IFD and its associated functional units.

7.4.4.2 Action

```
OUT    Status          GetIFDCapabilities (
IN     ContextHandleType ContextHandle,
IN     string           IFDName,
OUT    IFDCapabilitiesType IFDCapabilities
);
```

7.4.4.3 Parameters

`ContextHandle` addresses the established context with the IFD-Layer.

`IFDName` is the unique name of the IFD, which is used to address the specific IFD.

`IFDCapabilities` contains information about the capabilities of the given IFD and its functional units. It is of type `IFDCapabilitiesType`, which is structured as follows:

```
structure
{
    SlotCapabilityType          SlotCapability[ ],
    DisplayCapabilityType       DisplayCapability[ ],
    KeyPadCapapbilityType       KeyPadCapability[ ],
    BioSensorCapabilityType     BioSensorCapability[ ],
    BooleanType                 OpticalSignalUnit,
    BooleanType                 AcousticSignalUnit
} IFDCapabilitiesType
```

`SlotCapability` is present for every existing slot of the IFD and contains information about this slot. It is of type `SlotCapabilityType`, which is structured as follows:

```
structure
{
    nonNegativeInteger          Index,
    BooleanType                 ContactBased
} SlotCapabilityType
```

`Index` – is the index of the slot ranging from 0 to number of slots minus 1.

`ContactBased` – indicates whether the slot is for contact-based or contactless cards.

`DisplayCapability` is present for every existing display of the IFD and contains information its capabilities. It is of type `DisplayCapabilityType`, which is structured as follows:

```
structure
{
    nonNegativeInteger  Index,
    nonNegativeInteger  Lines,
    nonNegativeInteger  Columns,
    nonNegativeInteger  VirtualLines
                        OPTIONAL,
    nonNegativeInteger  VirtualColumns
                        OPTIONAL
}DisplayCapabilitiesType
```

`Index` – is the index of the display ranging from 0 to number of displays minus 1.

`Lines` – contains the number of visible lines supported by the display of the card terminal.

`Columns` – contains the number of visible columns supported by the display of the card terminal.

`VirtualLines` – optionally contains the number of virtual lines supported by the display of the card terminal via scrolling.

`VirtualColumns` – optionally contains the number of virtual columns supported by the display of the card terminal via panning.

`KeyPadCapability` is present for every existing key pad of the IFD and contains information its capabilities. It is of type `KeyPadCapabilityType`, which is structured as follows:

```
structure
{
    nonNegativeInteger  Index,
    positiveInteger     Keys
}KeyPadCapabilitiesType
```

`Index` – is the index of the key pad ranging from 0 to number of key pads minus 1.

`Keys` – contains the number keys of the key pad.

`BioSensorCapability` is present for every existing biometric sensor of the the IFD and contains information about the capabilities of this biometric sensor. It is of type `BioSensorCapabilityType`, which is structured as follows:

```
structure
{
    nonNegativeInteger Index,
    nonNegativeInteger BiometricType
} BioSensorCapabilityType
```

`Index` – is the index of the biometric sensor ranging from 0 to number of biometric sensors minus 1.

`BiometricType` – indicates the type of the biometric sensor as defined in ISO/IEC 19784-1:2006, 7.8.

`OpticalSignalUnit` indicates whether an optical signal unit (e.g. LED) is available in the card terminal.

`AcousticSignalUnit` indicates whether an acoustic signal unit (e.g. beep) is available in the card terminal.

7.4.4.4 Return Codes

<code>IFD_OK</code>	The request was successful.
<code>IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR</code>	The request timed out before completion.
<code>IFD_INVALID_CONTEXT_HANDLE</code>	The provided <code>ContextHandle</code> is invalid.
<code>IFD_UNKNOWN_IFD</code>	The provided <code>IFDName</code> is unknown.
<code>API_UNKNOWN_ERROR</code>	There was some unknown error.

7.4.5 GetStatus

A slot terminal related request.

7.4.5.1 Purpose

The `GetStatus` request returns the current status of an Interface Device and its associated functional units.

7.4.5.2 Action

OUT	Status	GetStatus (
IN	ContextHandleType	ContextHandle,
IN	string	IFDName OPTIONAL,
OUT	IFDStatusType	IFDStatus []
		);

7.4.5.3 Parameters

`ContextHandle` addresses the established context with the IFD-Layer.

`IFDName` optionally indicates the name of a specific IFD for which the status shall be returned. If this parameter is omitted the status of all existing IFDs is returned.

`IFDStatus` may be present for the particular IFD or all IFDs and contains the current status of an IFD. It is of type `IFDStatusType`, which is structured as follows:

```

structure
{
    String                    IFDName,
    BooleanType               Connected OPTIONAL,
    SlotStatusType            SlotStatus [ ],
    BooleanType               ActiveAntenna OPTIONAL,
    SimpleFUStatusType        DisplayStatus [ ],
    SimpleFUStatusType        KeyPadStatus [ ],
    SimpleFUStatusType        BioSensorStatus [ ]
} IFDStatusType

```

`Connected` contains the information whether there is currently a connection to the IFD. If the terminal is directly connected to the host (via RS232, USB etc.) the parameter may be omitted.

`SlotStatus` is present for every existing slot of the IFD and contains information about its current status. It is of type `SlotStatusType`, which is structured as follows:

```

structure
{
    nonNegativeInteger        Index,
    BooleanType               CardAvailable,
    OCTET STRING              ATRorATS OPTIONAL
} SlotStatusType

```

`Index` – is the index of the slot ranging from 0 to number of slots minus 1.

`CardAvailable` – is TRUE if a card is captured by the indicated slot.

	ATRorATS – may contain the ATR or ATS of a captured card.
ActiveAntenna	contains the status of the RF-antenna used by the proximity coupling device(s). If there are no slots for contactless cards this parameter may be omitted.
DisplayStatus	is present for every existing display of the IFD and contains information about its current status. It is of type SimpleFUStatusType, which is structured as follows: <div data-bbox="821 571 1492 728" data-label="Text"> <pre> structure { NonNegativeInteger Index, BooleanType Available } SimpleFUStatusType </pre> </div> Index – is the index of the functional unit ranging from 0 to number of functional units minus 1. Available – indicates whether the functional unit is currently busy or whether it is available for requests.
KeyPadStatus	is present for every existing key pad of the IFD and contains information about its current status. It is of type SimpleFUStatusType, which is defined above.
BioSensorStatus	is present for every existing biometric sensor of the IFD and contains information about its current status. It is of type SimpleFUStatusType, which is defined above.

7.4.5.4 Return Codes

IFD_OK	The request was successful.
IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR	The request timed out before completion.
IFD_INVALID_CONTEXT_HANDLE	The provided ContextHandle is invalid.
IFD_UNKNOWN_IFD	The provided IFDName is unknown.
IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR	There was some unknown error.

7.4.6 Wait

A slot terminal related request.

7.4.6.1 Purpose

The `Wait` request allows the client-application to be informed that some event at an indicated list of IFDs has occurred.

7.4.6.2 Action

OUT	Status	Wait (
IN	ContextHandleType	ContextHandle,
IN	positiveInteger	Timeout OPTIONAL,
IN	CallbackChannelHandleType	CallbackChannel OPTIONAL,
IN	IFDStatusType	IFDStatus [],
OUT	string	SessionIdentifier OPTIONAL,
OUT	IFDStatusType	IFDEvent []
		);

7.4.6.3 Parameters

ContextHandle addresses the established context with the IFD-Layer.

Timeout is an optional parameter, which specifies the time in milliseconds which shall be waited for an event. If this parameter is not present, the call will wait forever or until `Cancel` is called.

CallbackChannel a callback function allowing an asynchronous callback from the `Wait` function when triggered by a preset event.

IFDStatus is present for every IFD, which shall be monitored and contains the currently assumed status of the IFD. It is of type `IFDStatusType`, which is defined above.

SessionIdentifier a session identifier that identifies the specific `Wait` session when the callback function is called.

IFDEvent returns information about the occurred event(s). While it is also of type `IFDStatusType` it should only contain the information about the occurred events. I.e. the subset of the status information which has changed.

7.4.6.4 Return Codes

<code>IFD_OK</code>	The request was successful.
<code>IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR</code>	The request timed out before completion.
<code>IFD_INVALID_CONTEXT_HANDLE</code>	The provided <code>ContextHandle</code> is invalid.
<code>IFD_UNKNOWN_IFD</code>	The provided <code>IFDName</code> is unknown.
<code>IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR</code>	There was some unknown error.

7.4.7 Cancel

A slot terminal related request.

7.4.7.1 Purpose

The `Cancel` request tries to terminate the currently processed command at a given IFD.

7.4.7.2 Action

OUT	Status	Cancel (
IN	ContextHandleType	ContextHandle,
IN	string	SessionIdentifier OPTIONAL,
IN	string	IFDName
		);

7.4.7.3 Parameters

`ContextHandle` addresses the established context with the IFD-Layer.

`SessionIdentifier` a session identifier that identifies the specific Wait session being cancelled and its associated callback function.

`IFDName` is the unique name of the IFD, which is used to address the IFD at which the currently processed command shall be cancelled.

7.4.7.4 Return Codes

<code>IFD_OK</code>	The request was successful.
<code>IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR</code>	The request timed out before completion.
<code>IFD_CANCEL_NOT_POSSIBLE</code>	The current operation can not be cancelled.
<code>IFD_INVALID_CONTEXT_HANDLE</code>	The provided <code>ContextHandle</code> is invalid.
<code>IFD_UNKNOWN_IFD</code>	The provided <code>IFDName</code> is unknown.
<code>IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR</code>	There was some unknown error.

7.4.8 ControlIFD

A slot terminal related request.

7.4.8.1 Purpose

The `ControlIFD` request allows to send commands directly to the IFD.

7.4.8.2 Action

OUT	Status	ControlIFD (
IN	ContextHandleType	ContextHandle,
IN	string	IFDName,
IN	OCTET STRING	Command,
OUT	OCTET STRING	Response
		) ;

7.4.8.3 Parameters

ContextHandle	addresses the established context with the IFD-Layer.
IFDName	is the unique name of the IFD to which the command shall be sent.
Command	is the command which shall be sent to the IFD.
Response	is the response which shall be returned by the IFD.

7.4.8.4 Return Codes

IFD_OK	The request was successful.
IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR	The request timed out before completion.
IFD_INVALID_CHANNEL_HANDLE	The provided ChannelHandle is invalid.
IFD_UNKNOWN_IFD	The provided IFDName is unknown.
IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR	There was some unknown error.

7.4.9 Connect

A slot related request.

7.4.9.1 Purpose

The `Connect` request connects to an ICC in a particular slot of an IFD.

7.4.9.2 Action

OUT	Status	Connect (
IN	ContextHandleType	ContextHandle,
IN	string	IFDName,
IN	NonNegativeInteger	Slot,
IN	BooleanType	Exclusive OPTIONAL,
OUT	SlotHandleType	SlotHandle
		);

7.4.9.3 Parameters

ContextHandle	addresses the established context with the IFD-Layer.
IFDName	is the unique name of the IFD, which is used to connect to a card.
Slot	is the index of the slot ranging from 0 to number of slots minus 1.
Exclusive	indicates whether the connection to the card shall be exclusive or shared. If the parameter evaluates to <code>TRUE</code> the connection is exclusive. If the parameter evaluates to <code>FALSE</code> or if the parameter is missing, the connection to the card may be shared with other requestors.
SlotHandle	is a handle identifying the connection to the smart card.

7.4.9.4 Return Codes

IFD_OK	The request was successful.
IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR	The request timed out before completion.
IFD_INVALID_CONTEXT_HANDLE	The provided ContextHandle is invalid.
IFD_UNKNOWN_IFD	The provided IFDName is unknown.
IFD_UNKNOWN_SLOT	The addressed slot is unknown.
IFD_SHARING_VIOLATION	The request was not successful, because the card is already used by another process.
IFD_NO_CARD	The request was not successful, because there is no card captured by the indicated slot.
IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR	There was some unknown error.

7.4.10 Disconnect

A slot related request.

7.4.10.1 Purpose

The `Disconnect` request terminates the connection to a slot and may optionally perform an additional action, like ejecting the card for example.

7.4.10.2 Action

OUT	Status	Disconnect (
IN	SlotHandleType	SlotHandle,
IN	string	Action OPTIONAL
		) ;

7.4.10.3 Parameters

`SlotHandle` is a handle identifying the connection to the smart card.

`Action` is an optional parameter, which may specify an additional action, where the following values are possible:

`Reset` resets the card

`Unpower` unpowers and terminates access to the card

`Eject` ejects the card from the reader

`Confiscate` is used to indicate that a sophisticated commercial reader should move the card to the confiscation bin and not return it to the user

7.4.10.4 Return Codes

`IFD_OK` The request was successful.

`IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR` The request timed out before completion.

`IFD_INVALID_SLOT_HANDLE` The provided `SlotHandle` is invalid.

`IFD_UNKNOWN_ACTION` The requested action to be performed is unknown.

`API_UNKNOWN_ERROR` There was some unknown error.

7.4.11 BeginTransaction

A slot related request.

7.4.11.1 Purpose

The `BeginTransaction` request starts a transaction through which a series of linked requests can be sent to the indicated slot, with rollback facilities if all of the requests are not successfully completed.

7.4.11.2 Action

OUT	Status	BeginTransaction (
IN	SlotHandleType	SlotHandle
		) ;

7.4.11.3 Parameters

`SlotHandle` is a handle identifying the connection to the smart card.

7.4.11.4 Return Codes

<code>IFD_OK</code>	The request was successful.
<code>IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR</code>	The request timed out before completion.
<code>IFD_INVALID_SLOT_HANDLE</code>	The provided <code>SlotHandle</code> is invalid.
<code>IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR</code>	There was some unknown error.

7.4.12 EndTransaction

A slot related request.

7.4.12.1 Purpose

The `EndTransaction` request terminates a currently open transaction with the indicated card.

7.4.12.2 Action

```
OUT    Status    EndTransaction (
IN     SlotHandleType SlotHandle
      ) ;
```

7.4.12.3 Parameters

`SlotHandle` is a handle identifying the connection to the smart card.

7.4.12.4 Return Codes

IFD_OK	The request was successful.
IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR	The request timed out before completion.
IFD_INVALID_SLOT_HANDLE	The provided <code>SlotHandle</code> is invalid.
IFD_NO_TRANSACTION_STARTED	Indicates that no transaction was started.
IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR	There was some unknown error.

7.4.13 Transmit

A slot related request.

7.4.13.1 Purpose

The `Transmit` request sends an APDU to the indicated card.

7.4.13.2 Action

OUT	Status	Transmit (
IN	SlotHandleType	SlotHandle,
IN	OCTET STRING	InputAPDU,
OUT	OCTET STRING	OutputAPDU,
		);

7.4.13.3 Parameters

`SlotHandle` is a handle identifying the connection to the smart card.

`InputAPDU` is a byte string containing an APDU, which shall be sent to the card.

`OutputAPDU` is a byte string containing a response APDU from the card.

7.4.13.4 Return Codes

<code>IFD_OK</code>	The request was successful.
<code>IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR</code>	The request timed out before completion.
<code>IFD_INVALID_SLOT_HANDLE</code>	The provided <code>SlotHandle</code> is invalid.
<code>IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR</code>	There was some unknown error.

7.4.14 VerifyUser

A user related request.

7.4.14.1 Purpose

The `VerifyUser` request initiates the verification of a user with PIN or biometrics.

7.4.14.2 Action

OUT	Status	VerifyUser (
IN	SlotHandleType	SlotHandle,
IN	InputUnitType	InputUnit,
IN	nonNegativeInteger	DisplayIndex OPTIONAL,
IN	AltVUMessagesType	AltVUMessages OPTIONAL,
IN	positiveInteger	TimeoutUntilFirstKey OPTIONAL,
IN	positiveInteger	TimeoutAfterFirstKey OPTIONAL,
IN	OCTET STRING	Template
OUT	OCTET STRING	Response
		);

7.4.14.3 Parameters

`SlotHandle` is a handle identifying the connection to the smart card.

`InputUnit` indicates which input unit shall be used to capture the verification data. It is of type `InputUnitType`, which is defined as follows:

```
choice
{
    PinInputType          PinInput,
    BiometricInputType    BiometricInput
} InputUnitType
```

`PinInput` is used in case the user verification shall be performed with a pin (encompassing a password). It is of type `PinInputType`, which is defined as follows:

```
structure
{
    nonNegativeInteger    Index,
    PasswordAttributesType PasswordAttributes
} PinInputTypeType
```

`Index` is the index of the key pad which shall be used to capture the PIN.

`PasswordAttributes` specifies the format of the PIN through a structure.

```
structure
{
    PasswordFlagsType      pwdFlagsType,
    PasswordTypeType       pwdType,
    nonNegativeInteger      minLength,
    nonNegativeInteger      storedLength,
```

```

nonNegativeInteger    maxLength
OPTIONAL,
PadCharType          padChar OPTIONAL,
DateTimeType
    lastPasswordChange
                                OPTIONAL,
} PasswordAttributesType

```

The parameters specified through the PasswordAttributesType structure are defined in ISO/IEC 7816-15.

BiometricInput is used in case the user verification shall be performed using biometrics. It is of type BiometricInputType, which is defined as follows:

```

structure
{
    nonNegativeInteger    Index,
    nonNegativeInteger    BiometricSubType
} BiometricInputType

```

Index is the index of the biometric sensor, which shall be used to capture biometric data.

BiometricSubType specifies the biometric subtype as defined in ISO/IEC FDIS 19784-1:2006, 7.14.

DisplayIndex is the index of the display which shall be used to display the messages to guide the user. If no messages shall be displayed or the IFD is not equipped with a display this parameter may be omitted.

AltVUMessages is an optional parameter, which is used to explicitly specify the different messages (coded as UTF-8 according to RFC3629), which shall be displayed within the verification process. The parameter is of type AltVUMessagesType, which is specified as follows:

```

structure
{
    string    AuthenticationRequestMessage OPTIONAL,
    string    SuccessMessage OPTIONAL,
    string    AuthenticationFailedMessage OPTIONAL,
    string    RequestConfirmationMessage OPTIONAL,
    string    CancelMessage OPTIONAL
} AltVUMessagesType

```

The different parameters may be used to explicitly specify what is to be displayed within the verification process. If some parameter is omitted an appropriate (set of) default message(s) will be used.

TimeoutUntilFirstKey is an optional parameter, which specifies the timeout in milliseconds until the first key is pressed.

TimeoutAfterFirstKey is an optional parameter, which specifies the timeout in milliseconds after the first key is pressed.

Template is the template in which the verification data shall be inserted by the IFD before they are sent to the card.

Response is the response from the card.

7.4.14.4 Return Codes

IFD_OK	The request was successful.
IFD_TIMEOUT_ERROR	The request timed out before completion.
IFD_INVALID_SLOT_HANDLE	The provided SlotHandle is invalid.
IFD_UNKNOWN_INPUT_UNIT	There indicated input unit is unknown.
IFD_CANCELLATION_BY_USER	The user cancelled the operation.
IFD_UNKNOWN_ERROR	There was some unknown error.
IFD_UNKNOWN_PIN_FORMAT	The indicated PIN-format is unknown.
IFD_UNKNOWN_BIOMETRIC_SUBTYPE	The indicated PIN-format is unknown.