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**Medizinische Informatik –
Kommunikation von Patientendaten in elektronischer Form –
Teil 4: Sicherheit (ISO 13606-4:2019);
Englische Fassung EN ISO 13606-4:2019**

Health informatics –
Electronic health record communication –
Part 4: Security (ISO 13606-4:2019);
English version EN ISO 13606-4:2019

Informatique de santé –
Communication du dossier de santé informatisé –
Partie 4: Sécurité (ISO 13606-4:2019);
Version anglaise EN ISO 13606-4:2019

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Nationales Vorwort

Dieses Dokument (EN ISO 13606-4:2019) wurde in der WG 1 „Architecture, Frameworks and Models“ des Technischen Komitees ISO/TC 215 „Health Informatics“ und mit dem Technischen Komitee CEN/TC 251 „Medizinische Informatik“, dessen Sekretariat von NEN (Niederlande) gehalten wird, erarbeitet.

Der Arbeitsausschuss NA 063-07-02 AA „Interoperabilität“ des Fachbereichs 7 „Medizinische Informatik“ des DIN-Normenausschusses Medizin (NAMed) hat an der Erarbeitung ebenfalls mitgewirkt.

Dieses Dokument enthält unter Berücksichtigung des Präsidialbeschlusses 1/2004 nur die englische Originalfassung von EN ISO 13606-4:2019.

Für die in diesem Dokument zitierten internationalen Dokumente wird im Folgenden auf die entsprechenden deutschen Dokumente hingewiesen:

ISO 13606-1	siehe	DIN EN ISO 13606-1
ISO 21298	siehe	DIN EN ISO 21298
ISO 22600 (all parts)	siehe	DIN EN ISO 22600 (alle Teile)
ISO 27789	siehe	DIN EN ISO 27789
ISO 27799	siehe	DIN EN ISO 27799
ISO/IEC 27002	siehe	DIN EN ISO/IEC 27002

Änderungen

Gegenüber DIN EN 13606-4:2007-06 wurden folgende Änderungen vorgenommen:

- a) Übernahme der Internationalen Norm;
- b) der Norminhalt wurde mit ISO 13940 *Medizinische Informatik — Begriffssystem zur Unterstützung der Kontinuität der Versorgung* und der Normenreihe ISO 12967 *Medizinische Informatik — Servicearchitektur* harmonisiert;
- c) die Teile dieser Normenreihe wurden untereinander harmonisiert.

Frühere Ausgaben

DIN V ENV 13606-3: 2000-09

DIN EN 13606-4: 2007-06

Zusammenfassung

Dieses Dokument beschreibt eine Methodik zur Spezifikation der Privilegien, die für den Zugriff auf eGA-Daten erforderlich sind. Diese Methodik ist Teil der gesamten eGA-Übermittlungsarchitektur, die in ISO 13606- 1 definiert ist.

Dieses Dokument verfolgt die Absicht, die Anforderungen, die sich ausschließlich auf die eGA-Übermittlung beziehen, zu behandeln und eGA-spezifische Informationen darzustellen und zu übermitteln, die eine Zugangsentscheidung unterstützen. Es bezieht sich auch auf allgemeine Sicherheitsanforderungen, die für die eGA-Übermittlung gelten, und zeigt technische Lösungen und Standards auf, welche Einzelheiten zu Diensten spezifizieren, die diese Sicherheitsanforderungen erfüllen.

ANMERKUNG Sicherheitsanforderungen für eGA-Systeme, die nicht mit der Übermittlung von eGAs zusammenhängen, liegen außerhalb des Anwendungsbereichs dieses Dokuments.

Nationaler Anhang NA (informativ)

Begriffe

Die Benummerung der folgenden Begriffe und Abkürzungen sind identisch mit der Benummerung in der englischen Fassung.

3 Begriffe

Für die Anwendung dieses Dokuments gelten die Begriffe nach ISO 13606-1 und die folgenden Begriffe.

ISO und IEC stellen terminologische Datenbanken für die Verwendung in der Normung unter den folgenden Adressen bereit:

- ISO Online Browsing Platform: verfügbar unter <http://www.iso.org/obp>
- IEC Electropedia: verfügbar unter <http://www.electropedia.org/>

3.1

Autorisierer

(en: authority)

Entität, die für die Ausgabe von Zertifikaten verantwortlich ist

Anmerkung 1 zum Begriff: In dieser Spezifikation werden zwei Typen unterschieden: Zertifizierungsstelle, die Public-Key-Zertifikate ausstellt, und Attributautorisierer, der Attributzertifikate ausstellt.

3.2

Verfügbarkeit

(en: availability)

Eigenschaft, einer berechtigten Instanz auf Verlangen zugänglich und nutzbar zu sein

[QUELLE: ISO 7498-2:1989]

3.3

Identifikator

(en: identifier)

Information, die verwendet wird, um vor einer möglichen Bestätigung durch einen entsprechenden Authentifikator eine Identität zu beanspruchen

3.4

funktionelle Rolle

(en: functional role)

Rolle, die an eine Aktivität gebunden ist

Anmerkung 1 zum Begriff: Funktionelle Rollen können so ausgewiesen sein, dass sie während der Handlung auszuführen sind.

[QUELLE: ISO 21298:2017, 3.9]

3.5

Policy

(en: policy)

Satz von rechtlichen, politischen, organisationsinternen, funktionellen und technischen Pflichten im Hinblick auf Kommunikation und Kooperation

[QUELLE: ISO 22600-1:2014, 3.13]

3.6

Privileg

(en: privilege)

Fähigkeit, die einer Entität von einer *Autorität* (3.1) zugewiesen wird

[QUELLE: ISO 22600-1:2014, 3.17]

3.7

Sensibilität

(en: sensitivity)

Eigenschaft einer Ressource, die deren Wert oder Wichtigkeit impliziert

[QUELLE: ISO 22600-2:2014, 3.37]

Nationaler Anhang NB (informativ)

Literaturhinweise

DIN EN ISO 13606-1, *Medizinische Informatik — Kommunikation von Patientendaten in elektronischer Form — Teil 1: Referenzmodell*

DIN EN ISO 21298, *Medizinische Informatik — Funktionelle und strukturelle Rollen*

DIN EN ISO 22600 (alle Teile), *Medizinische Informatik — Privilegienmanagement und Zugriffssteuerung*

DIN EN ISO 27789, *Medizinische Informatik — Audit-Trails für elektronische Gesundheitsakten*

DIN EN ISO 27799, *Medizinische Informatik — Informationssicherheitsmanagement im Gesundheitswesen bei Verwendung der ISO/IEC 27002*

DIN EN ISO/IEC 27002, *Informationstechnik — Sicherheitsverfahren — Leitfaden für Informationssicherheitsmaßnahmen*

— Leerseite —

English Version

Health informatics - Electronic health record communication - Part 4: Security (ISO 13606-4:2019)

Informatique de santé - Communication du dossier de
santé informatisé - Partie 4: Sécurité
(ISO 13606-4:2019)

Medizinische Informatik - Kommunikation von
Patientendaten in elektronischer Form - Teil 4:
Sicherheit (ISO 13606-4:2019)

This European Standard was approved by CEN on 2 July 2019.

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This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translation under the responsibility of a CEN member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the same status as the official versions.

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EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG

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European foreword

This document (EN ISO 13606-4:2019) has been prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 215 "Health informatics" in collaboration with Technical Committee CEN/TC 251 "Health informatics" the secretariat of which is held by NEN.

This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by January 2020, and conflicting national standards shall be withdrawn at the latest by January 2020.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

This document supersedes EN 13606-4:2007.

According to the CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organizations of the following countries are bound to implement this European Standard: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Endorsement notice

The text of ISO 13606-4:2019 has been approved by CEN as EN ISO 13606-4:2019 without any modification.

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Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization.

The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).

Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not constitute an endorsement.

For an explanation on the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.

This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 215, *Health Informatics*.

This first edition of ISO 13606-4 cancels and replaces the first edition of ISO/TS 13606-4:2009, which has been technically revised. The main changes compared to the previous edition are as follows:

— Functional Roles

- Some terms for functional roles have been updated to align with CONTSYS.
- The rules for using this vocabulary now state that jurisdictions can nominate alternatives or specialisations of these terms if needed.

— Access policy model

The access policy model now also permits jurisdictional alternative terms to be used where appropriate.

— Audit log model

The audit log model now aligns with the ISO 27789 standard for EHR audit trails. It contains more information than is present in ISO 27789: it is a kind of specialisation specifically dealing with the communication of EHR information and audit log information. It therefore includes information about the EHR extract or the audit log extract being communicated, which is beyond the scope of ISO 27789.

A list of all parts in the ISO 13606 series can be found on the ISO website.

Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user's national standards body. A complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.

Introduction

0.1 General

This document, is part of a five-part standard series, published jointly by CEN and ISO through the Vienna Agreement. In this document, dependency upon any of the other parts of this series is explicitly stated where it applies.

0.2 Challenge addressed by this document

The communication of electronic health records (EHRs) in whole or in part, within and across organisational boundaries, and sometimes across national borders, is challenging from a security perspective. Health records should be created, processed and managed in ways that assure the confidentiality of their contents and legitimate control by patients in how they are used. Around the globe, these principles are progressively becoming enshrined in national data protection legislation. These instruments declare that the subject of care has the right to play a pivotal role in decisions on the content and distribution of his or her electronic health record, as well as rights to be informed of its contents. The communication of health record information to third parties should take place only with patient consent (which can be any freely given specific and informed indication of his or her wishes by which the data subject signifies his or her agreement to personal data relating to him or her being processed). More details can be found in ISO 22600-3. For EHR communication across national borders, ISO 22857 provides guidance that can be used to define appropriate security policy specifications.

Ideally, each fine grained entry in a patient's record should only be accessed by those persons who have permissions to view that information, specified by or approved by the patient and reflecting the dynamic nature of the set of persons with legitimate duty of care towards the patient through his or her lifetime. The access control list will ideally also include those persons who have permissions to access the data for reasons other than a duty of care (such as health service management, epidemiology and public health, consented research) but exclude any information that they do not need to see or which the patient feels is too personal for them to access. On the opposite side, the labelling by patients or their representatives of information as personal or private should ideally not hamper those who legitimately need to see the information in an emergency, nor accidentally result in genuine health care providers having such a filtered perspective that they are misled into managing the patient inappropriately. Patients' views on the inherent sensitivity¹⁾ of entries in their health record can evolve over time, as their personal health anxieties alter or as societal attitudes to health problems change. Patients might wish to offer some heterogeneous levels of access to family, friends, carers and members of their community. Families might wish to provide a means by which they are able to access parts of each other's records (but not necessarily to equal extents) in order to monitor the progress of inherited conditions within a family tree.

Such a set of requirements is arguably more extensive than that required of the data controllers in most other industry sectors. It is in practice made extremely complex by:

- the large number of health record entries made on a patient during the course of modern health care;
- the large number of health care personnel, often rotating through posts, who might potentially come into contact with a patient at any one time;
- the large number of organisations with which a patient might come into contact during his or her lifetime;
- the difficulty (for a patient or for anyone else) of classifying in a standardized way how sensitive a record entry might be;
- the difficulty of determining how important a single health record entry might be to the future care of a patient, and to which classes of user;

1) The term sensitivity is widely used in the security domain for a broad range of safeguards and controls, but in this document the term refers only to access controls.

- the logically indelible nature of the EHR and the need for revisions to access permissions to be rigorously managed in the same way as revisions to the EHR entries themselves;
- the need to determine appropriate access very rapidly, in real time, and potentially in a distributed computing environment;
- the high level of concern expressed by a growing minority of patients to have their consent for disclosure recorded and respected;
- the low level of concern the majority of patients have about these requirements, which has historically limited the priority and investment committed to tackling this aspect of EHR communications.

To support interoperable EHRs, and seamless communication of EHR data between health care providers, the negotiation required to determine if a given requester for EHR data should be permitted to receive the data should be capable of automation. If this were not possible, the delays and workload of managing human decisions for all or most record communications would obviate any value in striving for data interoperability.

The main principles of the approach to standards development in the area of EHR communications access control are to match the characteristics and parameters of a request to the EHR provider's policies, and to any access control or consent declarations within the specified EHR, to maintain appropriate evidence of the disclosure, and to make this capable of automated processing. In practice, efforts are in progress to develop international standards for defining access control and privilege management systems that would be capable of computer-to-computer negotiation. However, this kind of work is predicated upon health services agreeing a mutually consistent framework for defining the privileges they wish to assign to staff, and the spectrum of sensitivity they offer for patients to define within their EHRs. This requires consistency in the way the relevant information is expressed, to make this sensibly scalable at definition-time (when new EHR entries are being added), at run-time (when a whole EHR is being retrieved or queried), and durable over a patient's lifetime. It is also important to recognize that, for the foreseeable future, diversity will continue to exist between countries on the specific approaches to securing EHR communications, including differing legislation, and that a highly prescriptive approach to standardization is not presently possible.

This document therefore does not prescribe the access rules themselves. It does not specify who should have access to what and by means of which security mechanisms; these need to be determined by user communities, national guidelines and legislation. However, it does define a basic framework that can be used as a minimum specification of EHR access policy, and a richer generic representation for the communication of more fine-grained detailed policy information. This framework complements the overall architecture defined in ISO 13606-1, and defines specific information structures that are to be communicated as part of an EHR_EXTRACT defined in ISO 13606-1. Some of the kinds of agreement necessary for the security of EHR communication are inevitably outside the scope of this document, and are covered more extensively in ISO 22600 (Privilege Management and Access Control).

It should be noted that there are a number of explicit and implicit dependencies on use of other standards alongside this document, for overall cohesion of an interoperable information security deployment. In addition to agreement about the complete range of appropriate standards, a relevant assurance regime would be required (which is beyond the scope of this document).

0.3 Communication scenarios

0.3.1 Data flows

The interfaces and message models required to support EHR communication are the subject of ISO 13606-5. The description here is an overview of the communications process in order to show the interactions for which security features are needed. Figure 1 illustrates the key data flows and scenarios that need to be considered by this document. For each key data flow there will be an acknowledgement response, and optionally a rejection may be returned instead of the requested data.




Figure 1 — Principal data flows and security-related business processes covered by this document

The EHR Requester, EHR Recipient and Audit Log Reviewer might be healthcare professionals, the patient, a legal representative or another party with sufficient authorization to access healthcare information. Both the EHR_EXTRACT and the audit log, if provided, might need to be filtered to limit the disclosure to match the privileges of the recipient. This aspect of access control is discussed later in this introduction (all parties shown here will need to maintain an audit log, not just the EHR Provider. However, for readability the other audit log processes are not shown or described here).

The following subclauses describe each data flow in Figure 1.

0.3.2 Request EHR data

This interaction is not always required (for example, EHR data might be pushed from Provider to Recipient as in the case of a discharge summary). The request interface needs to include a sufficient profile of the Requester to enable the EHR Provider to be in a position to make an access decision, to populate an audit log, and provide the appropriate data to the intended Recipient. In some cases the EHR Requester might not be the same party as the EHR Recipient – for example a software agent might trigger a notification containing EHR data to be sent to a healthcare professional. In such cases it is the EHR Recipient's credentials that will principally determine the access decision to be made.

An EHR request might need to include or reference consents for access and mandates for care, for example by providing some form of explicit consent from the patient, or a care mandate.

The negotiation between Requester and Provider of EHR data will increasingly be automated, and the information included in this interaction should be sufficient to enable a fully computerised policy negotiation.

The requirements for this interaction will be reflected in the REQUEST_EHR_EXTRACT interface model defined in ISO 13606-5.

0.3.3 Generate EHR access log entry

This is assumed practice in any EHR system, but it is not specified as a normative interface because of the diverse approaches and capabilities in present-day systems. The internal audit systems within any EHR system are not required to be interoperable except in support of the model defined in Clause 8 of this document and the corresponding interface defined in ISO 13606-5.

0.3.4 Acknowledge receipt of the EHR request

No healthcare-specific security considerations.

0.3.5 Make access decision, filter EHR data

When processing the EHR request, policies pertaining to the EHR Provider and access policies in the EHR itself all need to be taken into account in determining what data are extracted from the target EHR. This document cannot dictate the overall set of policies that might influence the EHR Provider, potentially deriving from national, regional, organisation-specific, professional and other legislation.

A decision to filter the EHR data on the basis of its sensitivity and the privileges of the EHR Requester and Recipient will need to conform to relevant policies and might need to balance the clinical risks of denying access to information with the medico-legal risks of releasing information.

This document however does define an overall framework for representing in an interoperable way the access policies that might relate to any particular EHR, authored by the patient or representatives. These might not be stored in the physical EHR system in this way; they might instead, for example, be integrated within a policy server linked to the EHR server.

This access decision is discussed in more detail in Clause 7.

0.3.6 Deny provision of the EHR_EXTRACT

If the access decision is to decline, a coarse-grained set of reasons needs to be defined in order to frame a suitable set of responses from the EHR Provider. However, it is important that the denial and any reason given does not imply to the recipient that the requested EHR data does exist – even the disclosure of its existence could itself be damaging to a patient.

No healthcare-specific security considerations– the interface model is defined in ISO 13606-5.

0.3.7 Provide the EHR_EXTRACT

It should be noted that the EHR Recipient need not be the same as an EHR Requester, and indeed the provision of an EHR need not have been triggered by a request. It might instead have been initiated by the provider as part of shared care pathway or to add new data to an existing EHR.

The EHR_EXTRACT is required to conform to the Reference Model defined in ISO 13606-1, and to the interface model defined in ISO 13606-5.

The EHR_EXTRACT sh include or reference any relevant access policies, represented in conformance with this document, to govern any onward propagation of the EHR data being communicated. Policies may only be referenced if the EHR recipient is known to have direct access to the same information by another means.

0.3.8 Acknowledge receipt of EHR_EXTRACT

No healthcare-specific security considerations.

0.3.9 Generate EHR access log entry

As described in 0.3.3.

0.3.10 Request EHR access log view