

MODEL COURSE 3.23

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY

2011 Edition

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
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Since its inception the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has recognized the importance of human resources to the development of the maritime industry and has given the highest priority to assisting developing countries in enhancing their maritime training capabilities through the provision or improvement of maritime training facilities at national and regional levels. IMO has also responded to the needs of developing countries for postgraduate training for senior personnel in administrations, ports, shipping companies and maritime training institutes by establishing the world Maritime University in Malmö, Sweden, in 1983.

In addition, it was appreciated that a comprehensive set of short model courses in various fields of maritime training would supplement the instruction provided by maritime academies and allow administrators and technical specialists already employed in maritime administrations, ports and shipping companies to improve their knowledge and skills in certain specialized fields. With the generous assistance of the Government of Norway, IMO developed model courses in response to these generally identified needs and now keeps them updated through a regular revision process taking into account any amendments to the requirements prescribed in IMO instruments and any technological developments in the field.

These model courses may be used by any training institution and, when the requisite financing is available, the Organization is prepared to assist developing countries in implementing any course.

E. E. MITROPOULOS
Secretary-General



Introduction

■ Purpose of the model courses

The purpose of the IMO model courses is to assist maritime training institutes and their teaching staff in organizing and introducing new training courses, or in enhancing, updating or supplementing existing training material where the quality and effectiveness of the training courses may thereby be improved.

It is not the intention of the model course program to present instructors with a rigid “teaching package” which they are expected to “follow blindly”. Nor is it the intention to substitute audio-visual or “programmed” material for the instructor’s presence. As in all training endeavors, the knowledge, skills and dedication of the instructor are the key components in the transfer of knowledge and skills to those being trained through IMO model course material.

Because educational systems and the cultural backgrounds of trainees in maritime subjects vary considerably from country to country, the model course material has been designed to identify the basic entry requirements and trainee target group for each course in universally applicable terms, and to specify clearly the technical content and levels of knowledge and skill necessary to meet the intent of IMO conventions and related recommendations.

■ Use of the model course

To use the model course the instructor should review the course plan and detailed syllabus, taking into account the information provided under the entry standards specified in the course framework. The actual level of knowledge and skills and the prior technical education of the trainees should be kept in mind during this review, and any areas within the detailed syllabus which may cause difficulties because of differences between the actual trainee entry level and that assumed by the course designer should be identified. To compensate for such differences, the instructor is expected to delete from the course, or reduce the emphasis on, items dealing with knowledge or skills already attained by the trainees. He should also identify any academic knowledge, skills or technical training which they may not have acquired.

By analyzing the detailed syllabus and the academic knowledge required to allow training in the technical area to proceed, the instructor can design an appropriate pre-entry course or, alternatively, insert the elements of academic knowledge required to support the technical training elements concerned at appropriate points within the technical course.

Adjustment of the course objectives, scope and content may also be necessary if in your maritime industry the trainees completing the course are to undertake duties which differ from the course objectives specified in the model course.

Within the course plan the course designers have indicated their assessment of the time that should be allotted to each learning area. However, it must be appreciated that these allocations are arbitrary and assume that the trainees have fully met all entry requirements of the course. The instructor should therefore review these assessments and may need to re-allocate the time required to achieve each specific learning objective or training outcome.

■ Lesson plans

Having adjusted the course content to suit the trainee intake and any revision of the course objectives, the instructor should draw up lesson plans based on the detailed syllabus. The detailed syllabus contains specific references to the textbooks or teaching material proposed for use in the course. Where no adjustment has been found necessary in the learning objectives of the detailed syllabus, the lesson plans may simply consist of the detailed syllabus with keywords or other reminders added to assist the instructor in making his presentation of the material.

■ Presentation

The presentation of concepts and methodologies must be repeated in various ways until the instructor is satisfied that the trainee has attained each specific learning objective. The syllabus is laid out in learning-objective format and each objective specifies what the trainee must be able to do as the learning outcome.

■ Implementation

For the course to run smoothly and to be effective, considerable attention must be paid to the availability and use of:

- properly qualified instructors;
- support staff;
- rooms and other spaces;
- equipment;
- textbooks, technical papers; and
- other reference material.

Thorough preparation is the key to successful implementation of the course. IMO has produced "Guidance on the Implementation of IMO Model Courses," which deals with this aspect in greater detail and is included as an attachment to this course.

Part A: Course Framework

■ Aims

This model course aims to provide guidance to seafarers on precautions to be taken to reduce the risks of piracy attacks and the possible response to a piracy threat.

■ Objective

Those who successfully complete this course will have sufficient knowledge and skills to:

1. understand piracy threats and current patterns;
2. carry out risk assessment;
3. prepare for transiting high risk area;
4. conduct transit of high risk areas; while monitoring the threat situation and
5. take effective action on encountering pirate crafts.

■ Entry standards

This course is open to all seafarers. There are no particular educational requirements.

■ Course certificate, diploma or document

Documentary evidence should be issued to those who have successfully completed this course indicating that the holder has completed training, as per this model course, on “Actions to be taken to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery”.

■ Course delivery

The outcome of this course may be achieved through various methods, but not limited to classroom training, in-service training, distance learning, computer-based training or combinations of these methods.

■ Course intake limitations

The maximum number of trainees would depend on the facilities and equipment available, bearing in mind the aims and objectives of this course, but preferably limited to 20.

■ Staff requirements

The instructor in charge of the course should have completed a Company Security Officer or Ship Security Officer course, or alternatively, have adequate experience in maritime security matters.

It is recommended that instructors should either have appropriate training in or be familiar with instructional techniques and training methods.

■ Teaching facilities and equipment

An ordinary classroom or similar meeting room with a blackboard or equivalent is sufficient for the lectures. In addition, when making use of audiovisual materials, it should be ensured that appropriate equipment is available. Finally, the use of shipboard environment (vessels or mock-ups) for certain segments of the course may enhance the overall effectiveness of this training.

■ Teaching aids (A)

- A1 Instructor Manual (Part D of the course)
- A2 Audiovisual aids: video compact disc player, TV, LCD projector, overhead projector, etc.
- A3 Photographs, models, or other representations of various type of vessels and vessel parts to illustrate operational elements and security vulnerabilities.
- A4 Video cassette(s): None recommended at this time.
- A5 Distance learning package(s): None recommended at this time.
- A6 Computer Based Training (CBT)
 - CBT # 156 – Piracy and Armed Robbery – by Seagull
Available from: Seagull AS
Gamleveien 36, P.O. Box 1062
N-3194 Horten, Norway
Tel: +47 33 03 09 10
 - Piracy and Armed Robbery – by Videotel
Available from: Videotel Marine International Ltd.
84 Newman Street
London W1P 3LD, UK
Tel: +44 171 299 1800
Fax: +44 171 299 1818
e-mail: mail@videotelmail.com
URL: www.videotel.co.uk
 - Best Management Practices to Avoid, Deter or Delay Acts of Piracy – by The Liberian Registry.

■ Bibliography (B)

- B1 OCIMF, Piracy – The East Africa/Somalia Situation, Practical Measures to Avoid, Deter or Delay Piracy Attacks, 2009
- B2 Website of “International Maritime Organization” – www.imo.org
- B3 Website of “Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” – www.recaap.org
- B4 Website of “IMB Piracy Reporting Center” – www.icc-ccs.org
- B5 Website of “Maritime Security Center (Horn of Africa)” – www.mschoa.org\
- B6 Website of the United Nations – www.un.org

- B7 Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, Peter Lehr, Lloyds Marine Intelligence Unit.
- B8 Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, Martin N – Murphy, Adelphi Paper.
- B9 Dangerous Waters, John Burnett, ISBN – 10: 0452284139

■ IMO references (R)

- R1 MSC.1/Circ.1334, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Guidance to ship-owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, Annex
- R2 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1335, 29 September 2009, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia developed by the industry, Annex 2
- R3 MSC.1/Circ.1333, 26 June 2009, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships

■ Textbooks (T)

None recommended at this time.



Part B: Course Outline and Timetable

Part B (1): Course Outline

Training Area	Hours	
	Lecture	Demonst
1. Introduction 1.1. Course overview * 1.2. Current piracy threats and patterns * 1.3. IMO and other organizations and their role * 1.4. Limitations of Protection Forces *	1.0	
2. Preparations prior transit through high risk areas 2.1. Information gathering. Risk assessment through available information 2.2. Passage planning and reporting including planning for convoys/group transit 2.3. Planning defensive measures * 2.3.1. General protection measures 2.3.2. Emergency drills and briefings 2.3.3. Lethal/non-lethal/passive defensive devices 2.3.4. Armed/unarmed security personnel	1.75	0.25
3. Threat recognition and response 3.1. In transit operations * 3.2. Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected * 3.3. Being certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted * 3.4. Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship * 3.5. Pirates/armed robbers start to board ship * 3.6. Pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship * 3.7. Pirates/armed robbers gain control of ship/one or more of the crew * 3.8. Surviving as a hostage * 3.9. Pirates/armed robbers disembark from ship * 3.10. In the event of military action *	2.0	
4. Surviving as a hostage *	0.5	
5. Post incident	0.5	
5.1. Debrief and incident reporting after attack		
SUB-TOTAL	5.75	0.25
TOTAL	6 HRS	

* For training programmes limited to support level staff, the course outline may be limited to the items marked with “*” and the duration for the subject area may be condensed to suit the target audience.

Part B (2): Course Timetable

Subject Area	Hours	
	Lecture	Demonst
Day/Session: Morning		
1. Introduction 1.1. Course overview 1.2. Current piracy threats and patterns 1.3. IMO and other organizations and their role 1.4. Limitations of Protection Forces.	1.0	
2. Preparations prior transit through high risk areas 2.1. Information gathering. Risk assessment through available information. 2.2. Passage planning and reporting including planning for convoys/group transit 2.3. Planning defensive measures 2.3.1. General protection measures 2.3.2. Emergency drills and briefings 2.3.3. Lethal/non-lethal/passive defensive devices 2.3.4. Armed/unarmed security personnel	1.75	0.25
Day/Session: Afternoon		
3. Threat recognition and response 3.1. In transit operations 3.2. Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected 3.3. Being certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted 3.4. Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship 3.5. Pirates/armed robbers start to board ship 3.6. Pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship 3.7. Pirates/armed robbers gain control of ship/one or more of the crew 3.8. Surviving as a hostage 3.9. Pirates/armed robbers disembark from ship 3.10. In the event of military action	2.0	
4. Surviving as a hostage	0.5	
5. Post incident	0.5	
5.1. Debrief and incident reporting after attack		
SUB-TOTAL	5.75	0.25
TOTAL	6 HRS	

Part C: Detailed Teaching Syllabus

The detailed teaching syllabus indicates the contents of the course and appropriate references and teaching aids.

■ Learning objectives

The detailed teaching syllabus has been written in learning objective format in which the objective describes what the trainee must do to demonstrate that knowledge has been transferred. This format is an appropriate teaching and assessment tool to express:

- the depth of understanding of a subject and the degree of familiarization with a subject on the part of the trainee,
- what capabilities the trainee should really have and be able to demonstrate.

Every instructor is encouraged to teach learning in an 'objective-related' way instead 'material-related'. In this context, all objectives are understood to be prefixed by the words, 'The expected learning outcome is that the trainee is able to... '.

To indicate the degree of learning outcome of this course, the learning objectives for the Detailed Teaching Syllabus can be classified in three 'dimensions':

- C (cognitive)
- A (affective)
- P (psycho-motor)

Within a dimension, they are hierarchised by increasing complexity (C1 to C6, A1 to A5, and P1 to P5) where the complexity (depth, familiarization) is expressed (following B. Bloom and others) by a typical verb as follows:

Cognitive dimension of learning objectives:

C1	Knowledge	describe, outline
C2	Comprehension	explain
C3	Application	apply, perform, operate
C4	Analysis	analyse
C5	Synthesis	synthesise, construct, plan
C6	Evaluation	assess

Affective dimension of learning objectives:

A1	Reception; notice	recognise
A2	Response	respond
A3	Value	value
A4	Organization	organise
A5	Value characterisation	accept, appreciate

Psycho-motor dimension of learning objectives:

P1	Imitation	imitate
P2	Manipulation	manipulate
P3	Precision	move, mark
P4	Co-ordination	co-ordinate (operations, menus)
P5	Naturalisation	automate, internalise

■ References and teaching aids

In order to assist the instructor, references are shown against the learning objective to indicate IMO references and publications, bibliographies, textbooks and other references, as well as additional teaching aids which the instructor may wish to use when preparing course material. The material is listed in the course framework. The following notations and abbreviations are used:

R	IMO reference
T	Text book and other references
B	Bibliography
A	Teaching aid
App.	Appendix
An.	Annex
Add.	Addendum
ch.	Chapter
p.	Page
pa.	Paragraph
reg.	Regulation
sect.	Section

The following are examples of the use of references:

“R1 pa 1 reg.1” refers to paragraph 1 of the Annex to MSC.1/Circ.1334, Piracy and armed robbery against ships, Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

“AI sect. 2.3” refers to section 2.3, planning defensive measures in the guidance notes of the instructor manual.

■ Note

Throughout the course, safe working practices are to be clearly defined and emphasized with reference to current international requirements and regulations. It is expected that the institution implementing the course will insert references to national and/or regional requirements and regulations as necessary.

Learning Objectives		IMO Reference	Textbooks, Bibliography	Teaching Aid
1.	Introduction 1 h			
1.1.	Course overview			A1 sect 1.1
1.1.1.	describe the topics and the emphasis of the course			
1.2.	Current piracy threats and patterns			A1 sect 1.2
1.2.1.	explain the difference between theft and piracy	R1 p1	B2, B6	
1.2.2.	describe typical attacks and lessons learnt	R2 p2	B2, B3	
1.2.3.	assess the summary and analysis made using incident statistics on piracy and hijacking	R2 p2		
1.3.	IMO, IMB and other organizations and their role			A1 sect 1.3
1.3.1.	recognize the role of IMO, IMB and Recap in protecting the integrity of international trade.		B2, B3, B4	
1.3.2.	recognize the role of MSCHOA and other such organizations		B5	
1.4.	Limitations of protection forces.		B6	A1 sect 1.4
1.4.1.	appreciate the laws under which the warships operate. Example – Malacca Straits, Gulf of Aden			
1.4.2.	appreciate the legal limitations of the authorities in providing assistance.			
2.	Preparations prior transit through high risk areas 1.5 h			
2.1.	Information gathering. Risk assessment through available information.		B1 sect 1	A1 sect 2.1
2.1.1.	assess high risk areas expected during the voyage using information available from navigation warnings as well as from websites such as IMB etc.			
2.1.2.	describe the role of the company security officer	R2 p4 sect 2b		
2.1.3.	assess the physical characteristics such as freeboard, speed etc that needs to be assessed when evaluating the risk	R1 pa 15		
2.2.	Passage planning and reporting including planning for convoys/group transit	R2, p3, sect 2a, 2c, 3	B1 sect 1	A1 sect 2.2
2.2.1.	based on the risk assessment carried out, assess options available such as re-routeing vessel, delaying anchoring, drifting, day/night time transit, use of group transits, convoys, etc. as well as planning/registering for group transit/convoy as applicable.	R1 pa 20		

Learning Objectives		IMO Reference	Textbooks, Bibliography	Teaching Aid
	2.2.2. recognize message formats and reporting requirements required for the route chosen as well as explain importance of preparing communications required to be sent out in case of attack.	R1 pa 11, 35, 44, R1 app 2, 5, 6, R2, p3, sect 2a,		
2.3.	Planning defensive measures	R2 p6 sect 4	B1 sect 2	
	2.3.1. general protection measures			A1 sect 2.3.1
	2.3.1.1. explain the general precautions such as keeping minimum cash on board, using discretion whilst communication on open channels and discussing voyage/ cargo details with persons unconnected with the ship's business	R1 pa 5, 6, 8, 24, 25		
	2.3.1.2. explain preparations to be made such as identifying blind spots and planning additional lookouts, anti piracy watches at the same time ensuring crew is adequately rested.	R1 pa 16, 28		
	2.3.1.3. explain importance of hardening ship by securing doors and external passageways, etc. that can be prepared for transit.	R1 pa 16, 17, 47, 48,		
	2.3.1.4. explain use of lighting, dummies, night vision binoculars etc.	R1 pa 16, 17, 45, 46		
	2.3.1.5. recognize pros and cons of switching off AIS and SOLAS requirements on same	R1 pa 6, 7, 36		
	2.3.2. emergency drills and briefings			A1 sect 2.3.2
	2.3.2.1. recognize the importance of reviewing and practicing contingency plans and conducting drills prior transit	R1 pa 15, 21, 22, 23		
	2.3.2.2. recognize the need to prepare a "Citadel"	R1 pa 50, 51		
	2.3.3. lethal/non-lethal/passive defensive devices			A1 sect 2.3.3
	2.3.3.1. appreciate IMOs position on non-arming of seafarers.	R1 pa 60, 61		
	2.3.3.2. know the legislative requirements when firearms are carried.	R1 pa 59		
	2.3.3.3. explain use of fire hoses to create a water curtain	R1 pa 57, 58		
	2.3.3.4. describe physical barriers available, such as netting, barbed wire, electric fencing etc. that can be used in preparation for transit.	R1 pa 56		
	2.3.4. armed/unarmed security personnel			A1 sect 2.3.4
	2.3.4.1. assess the use of armed and unarmed security personnel, and flag State's position on using armed security personnel.	R1 pa 62, 63, 64		

Learning Objectives		IMO Reference	Textbooks, Bibliography	Teaching Aid
3.	Threat recognition and response 2.5 h	R1 app 1		A1 sect 3
3.1.	In transit operations		B1 sect 3	
3.1.1.	recognize the importance of monitoring In transit operations such as anti-piracy watch, security measures deployed, following convoy/escort recommendations etc.	R2 p6 sect 5		
3.2.	Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected			
3.2.1.	outline actions in case suspect vessel detected	R1 pa 39, 65, 66	B1 sect 4	
3.3.	Being certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted			
3.3.1.	outline actions in case it is certain piracy/armed robbery will be attempted	R1 pa 52, 54, 55, 67	B1 sect 4	
3.4.	Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship			
3.4.1.	describe actions in case pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship	R1 pa 41, 68, 69	B1 sect 4	
3.5.	Pirates/armed robbers start to board ship			
3.5.1.	outline actions in case pirates/armed robbers start to board ship	R1 pa 70	B1 sect 4	
3.6.	Pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship			
3.6.1.	outline actions in case pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship	R1 pa 71, 72, 73, 74, 75	B1 sect 4	
3.7.	Pirates/armed robbers gain control of ship/one or more of the crew			
3.7.1.	outline actions in case pirates/armed robbers gain control of ship/one or more of the crew	R1 pa 76, 77, 78, 79, 80	B1 sect 4	
3.8.	Pirates/armed robbers disembark from ship			
3.8.1.	outline actions once pirates/armed robbers disembark from ship	R1 pa 81, 82, 92		
3.9.	In the event of military action			
3.9.1.	outline actions in the event of military action			
4.	Surviving as a hostage 0.5 h			A1 sect 4
4.1.1.	outline the basic DOs and DON'Ts in case taken as hostage.	R1 app 4		

Learning Objectives		IMO Reference	Textbooks, Bibliography	Teaching Aid
5.	Post incident 0.5 h			A1 sect 5
5.1.	Debrief and incident reporting after attack			
	5.1.1. appreciate the importance of carrying out a debrief after the incident	R1 pa 93, 94		
	5.1.2. prepare the report to be made after the incident.	R1 pa 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91		



Part D: Instructor Manual

The instructor manual provides guidance on the material that is to be presented during the course. This manual reflects the views of the course developers with respect to methodology and organization as well as what they consider relevant and important in light of their experience as instructors. Although the guidance given should be of value initially, each instructor should develop his/her own methods and ideas, recognize and refine what is successful, and discard that which does not work satisfactorily.

The material has been arranged under the following five main headings:

1. Introduction
2. Preparations prior transit through high risk areas
3. Threat recognition and response
4. Surviving as a hostage
5. Post incident.

The course outline provides guidance on the time allocation for the course material, but the instructor is free to modify this if it is deemed necessary. Based on the level of experience of the participants, when planning the training programme, the instructor should vary the process of delivery, increasing/decreasing the emphasis in all sections as appropriate. Where the training program is targeted only at support level staff, sections 2.1, 2.2 and 5 may be omitted and the remaining sections may be condensed as appropriate.

The detailed teaching syllabus must be studied carefully and, where appropriate, lesson plans or lecture notes compiled.

Preparation and planning are the most important criteria in effectively presenting this course. Availability and proper use of course materials is also essential for maximum efficacy in conveying the subject to trainees. The capabilities and limitations of the facilities in use may dictate that the learning objectives be adjusted but it is suggested that this be kept to a minimum.

Where possible, lectures should be supported by written course materials, videos, and other media that allow the trainee to embrace the material more fully. It will be necessary to prepare material for use with overhead projectors or for distribution to trainees as handouts.

Guidance Notes

1. Introduction

1.1. Course overview

As with other IMO Model Courses the starting point should be a brief statement of the purpose of the course, a short review of the timeline, an introduction of participants, determination of knowledge and experience levels, and a brief description of the teaching facility.

Instructors should emphasize that no one is being trained to fight pirates, but rather that trainees should be able to identify, deter, or mitigate such actions through proper planning, preparation, and coordination with various entities.

1.2. Current piracy threats and patterns

Piracy and armed attacks have existed for as long as the oceans were plied for commerce. The recent surge, particularly in the waters between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, off the Somali coast, and also in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore, has made it a very significant issue.

Trainees are most likely to appreciate the seriousness and the extent of the problem of piracy if they have a sense of the relevant history. Notable examples of piracy incidents should be shown here. To fully grasp the importance of the training provided by this course, current threats should be shown in the form of statistics as well as pictorially, showing the areas of attacks as well as emphasizing on the increase in the past few years. Those receiving this training must clearly sense the reality of today's piracy issues. Some may have adopted a mindset that places the problem of piracy in the past or in such a remote corner that it appears distant or irrelevant. Before continuing on with the course this mindset should be identified and addressed.

The Instructors should then show some typical attack profiles from the data accumulated which indicate the vulnerabilities exploited by the pirates, which are:

- (a) Low speed
- (b) Low freeboard
- (c) Inadequate planning and procedures
- (d) Visible low state of alertness and/or lack of evident precautionary measures on ships
- (e) Where a slow response by the ship is evident.

1.3. IMO, IMB and other organizations and their role in preventing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships

Trainees should appreciate the attempts by international bodies to minimize, stop, or otherwise control acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.

The instructor should describe the role played by International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and other intergovernmental organizations in assisting in anti-piracy measures.

The instructor should also advise roles of the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa) (MSCHOA), the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), and other such organizations in combating piracy.

1.4. Limitation of protection forces

The trainees must understand the limitations faced by governments and other protection agencies such as:

- (a) Legal barriers to prosecuting individuals captured in international waters. Countries are struggling to apply existing maritime law, international law, and their own laws, which limit them to having jurisdiction over their own citizens. According to piracy experts, the goal is to “deter and disrupt” pirate activity and pirates are often detained, interrogated, disarmed, and released. With millions of dollars at stake, pirates have little incentive to stop.
- (b) Prosecutions are rare for several reasons. Modern laws against piracy are almost non-existent. Warships that capture pirates have no jurisdiction to try them. Prosecutors have a hard time assembling witnesses and finding translators, and countries are reluctant to imprison pirates because they would be saddled with them upon their release.
- (c) Other limitation of protection forces:
 - (i) consent to foreign naval vessels and military aircraft entering the country’s territorial sea to assist merchant ships under attack by pirates and armed robbers (consented by Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in 2008)
 - (ii) “Innocent unless proven Guilty”. Protection Forces cannot take any physical action against suspected craft unless the pirate crafts show signs of aggression.

2. Preparations for prior transit through high risk areas

The focus of this section is to explain that vessels can significantly improve the chances of avoiding or delaying an act of piracy by taking a number of relatively simple preparatory steps.

2.1. Information gathering, risk assessment through available information

It would be helpful for the trainees to understand the role of the Company Security Officer in assimilating the information and trends of piracy attacks as well as information on Group convoys/escorts which is passed to the ship. The various sources used by the Company Security Officer could be identified. In addition, the ship also receives navigational warnings with Piracy Information.

In addition to gathering the above information, the trainees should also be able to understand the importance of assessing the ship's physical characteristics such as freeboard, speed etc when evaluating the risk.

2.2. Passage planning and reporting, including planning for convoys/group transit

The instructor should explain, how based on the information gathered, the Master identifies the options available for his passage such as choosing the route, delaying passage to make transit in high risk areas during day/night (as recommended), lifting anchor and drifting, using of group convoys/escorts, registration of transit/convoy etc and plan his passage accordingly.

Additionally, he must state the importance of identifying the reporting requirements for the routes chosen as well as of preparing "emergency communications" to be sent out in case of attack.

MSCHOA as well as various administrations routing guidelines and reporting could be shown as examples. Also, examples of application and use of escort vessel provided by various countries could be shown.

2.3. Planning defensive measures

The trainee must understand that the most important defensive measure would be to reduce the temptation for piracy. If the ship appears vigilant and ready, the chances of an attack is considerable reduced.

2.3.1 General protection measures

Early detection of a possible attack may often be the most effective deterrent. The Instructor should highlight the general preparations for transit in high risk areas. This should include enhanced surveillance by identification of blind spots; planning of additional lookouts and ensuring crew are adequately rested. Usage and availability of lighting, night vision binoculars and dummies as well as other surveillance and detection equipment should be explained.

The instructor must explain the importance of hardening the ship by securing, in accordance with the ship security plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine-room, steering gear compartments, officers' cabins and crew accommodation. The use of surveillance equipment as well as regular patrolling to monitor these areas should also be discussed. The instructor should explain that the intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. Securing by locking or other means of controlling access to unattended spaces adjoining areas could also prove useful.

Securing doors providing access to, and egress from, secure or key areas may give rise to concern over safety in the event of an accident. In any situation where there is a conflict between safety and security, it should be emphasized that the safety requirements should be paramount. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing accesses and exits to be secured or controlled.

The pros and cons of switching of the AIS, including SOLAS requirements, should be discussed stating the recommendations given by Best Management Practices issued by

industry bodies. However, it must be emphasized that in the event of an attack, it should be ensured that the AIS, if switched off, is turned on again and transmitting to enable security forces to locate the vessel.

2.3.2 Emergency drills and briefings

Ship security plans or emergency response procedures should ensure that masters and crews are made fully aware of the risks involved during attacks by pirates or armed robbers. In particular, they should address the dangers that may arise if a crew adopts an aggressive response to an attack. Aggressive responses, once an attack is underway and, in particular, once the attackers have boarded the ship, could significantly increase the risk to the ship and those on board.

It is important that any response to an incident is well planned and executed, and those involved should be as familiar as possible with a ship environment. The instructor should emphasize the importance of carrying out a drill prior to transit where the plan is reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack.

The concept of having a “citadel” can also be explained. A secure area or “citadel” can be designated and lock-down procedures rehearsed in order to delay access to control of the ship and buy time. Ideally this should be away from external bulkheads and portholes. Those whose duties necessarily involve working outside secure areas should have practised using alternative routes to return to a secure area and places of temporary refuge should be identified in advance for those who may not be able to return to a secure area during an attack.

2.3.3 Lethal/non-lethal/passive defensive devices

The instructor should emphasize IMO and other bodies position on Non Arming of Seafarers.

The instructor should explain how passive and non-lethal measures such as netting, barbed/razor wire, electric fencing, long-range acoustic devices etc., can be used as preventive measures to deter attackers and delay boarding. Even a simple act such as application of grease on the railings can delay the boarding. The use of water hoses to deter boarding should also be discussed.

Safety Precautions related to the use of these devices must be explained to the trainees.

If possible, the instructor should show also these defensive devices (such as Barbed and Razor wire, etc) and demonstrate its use.

2.3.4 Armed/unarmed security personnel

In this section the instructor advises on availability of Armed and Unarmed security personnel. However, it should be emphasized that use of privately contracted armed security personnel is a matter which may require approval from the flag state and all legal requirements of flag, port and coastal States should be met.

There may also be times when military teams or law enforcement officers duly authorized by the Government of the flag State carry firearms for the security of ships. In this case, boarding conditions should be defined by the States involved, including the flag State.

The trainees should be made aware that if armed security personnel are allowed on board, in case of an attack, there is a possibility of escalation of violence and other risks.

3. Threat recognition and response

This portion of the course is concerned with In Transit Operations and Incident Response. The instructor would here describe monitoring stage as well as the various stages that would be involved in a piracy attack and discuss the appropriate actions to be taken. The trainees should appreciate how robust actions from the ship which is approached by pirates may discourage the attackers.

The instructor should start this section by highlighting the items to be monitored whilst transiting the high risk area. These would include ensuring that pre arrival notifications have been sent, ensuring adequate security measures deployed and monitored, voyage plan is being followed, etc. The importance of making an early assessment of a threat should be emphasized so that as soon as it is noted that a threat is developing, it can be reported to the authorities.

The trainee should then be explained the action to be taken during various stages of the attack such as:

- Action to take when suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected
- Action to take when it is certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted
- Action to take when pirate/armed robbery vessel is in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship
- Action to take when pirates/armed robbers start to board ship
- Action to take when pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship
- Action to take when the pirates/armed robbers gain control of ship/one or more of the crew
- Surviving as a hostage
- Action to take when pirates/armed robbers disembark from the ship
- Action to take in the event of military action

Early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defence. The trainee should be reminded that the Master should not be limited by the guidance provided by various bodies and has the authority to take any action deemed necessary to protect the lives of passengers and crew.

When attackers are on board, the trainees should be advised that the actions of the master and crew should be aimed at:

- .1 securing the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship;
- .2 seeking to ensure that the crew remain in control of the navigation of the ship;
and
- .3 securing the earliest possible departure of the attackers from the ship.

Finally, the importance of a pre-arranged signal on the ship's siren or general alarm to alert the crew on "all clear" should be emphasized to the trainee.

4. Surviving as a hostage

This section should focus on preparing the trainees for the unfortunate event if they are taken as hostage. Every hostage or kidnap situation is different. There are no strict rules of behaviour; however, the basic DOs and DONTs can be explained.

5. Post incident

As after any other incident, the importance of carrying out a debriefing must be explained. The focus in this case will be on learning from the attack and identify areas of improvement. Those carrying out the debriefing should be aware that the seafarer may suffer from trauma or similar condition after being victimized under an attack from pirates or armed robbers. An important first step in reducing the risk from trauma is for masters to debrief crew immediately after the attack or release of a vessel in order to get crew to confront their experiences. An important second step is for counselling professionals to debrief crew as soon as possible after the attack or release of the vessel in order to assist the crew to manage their experiences.

Trainees will also appreciate that all security incidents must be reported in accordance with specific reporting requirements. It may be helpful to for instructors to provide several sample security incidents and have the class or individuals explain how they would go about reporting these incidents.

Part E: Evaluation

■ Introduction

The effectiveness of any evaluation depends on the accuracy of the description of what is to be measured.

The learning objectives that are used in the detailed teaching syllabus will provide a sound base for the construction of suitable tests for evaluating trainee progress.

■ Method of evaluation

The methods chosen to carry out an evaluation will depend upon what the trainee is expected to achieve in terms of knowing, comprehending and applying the course content.

The methods used can range from a simple question and answer discussion with the trainees (either individually or as a group) to prepared tests requiring the selection of correct or best responses from given alternatives, the correct matching of given items, the supply of short answers or the supply of more extensive written responses to prepared questions.

Where the course content is aimed at the acquisition of practical skills, the test would involve a practical demonstration by the trainee making use of appropriate equipment, tools, etc.

The responses demanded may therefore consist of:

- the recall of facts or information, by viva voce or objective tests
- the practical demonstration of an attained skill
- the oral or written description of procedures or activities
- the identification and use of data from sketches, drawings, maps, charts, etc.
- carrying out calculations to solve numerical problems
- the writing of an essay or report.

■ Validity

The evaluation must be based on clearly defined objectives, and it must truly represent what is to be measured. There must be a reasonable balance between the subject topics involved and also in the testing of trainees' KNOWLEDGE, COMPREHENSION and APPLICATION of concepts.

The time allocated for the trainee to provide a response is very important. Each question or task must be properly tested and validated before it is used to ensure that the test will provide a fair and valid evaluation.

■ Reliability

To be reliable, an evaluation procedure should produce reasonably consistent results no matter which set of papers or version of the test is used.

■ Subjective testing

Traditional methods of evaluation require the trainee to demonstrate what has been learned by stating or writing formal answers to questions.

Such evaluation is subjective in that it invariably depends upon the judgement of the evaluator. Different evaluators can produce quite different scores when marking the same paper or evaluating oral answers.

■ Objective testing

A variety of objective tests have been developed over the years. Their common feature is that the evaluation does not require a judgement by the evaluator. The response is either right or wrong.

One type of objective test involves supplying an answer, generally a single word, to complete the missing portion of a sentence. Another involves supplying a short answer of two or three words to a question. Such tests are known as 'completion tests' and 'short answer tests'.

Another form of objective testing consists of 'selective response tests' in which the correct, or best, response must be selected from given alternatives. Such tests may consist of 'matching tests', in which items contained in two separate lists must be matched, or they may be of the true/false type or of the multiple-choice type.

The most flexible form of objective test is the multiple-choice test, which presents the trainee with a problem and a list of alternative solutions, from which he must select the most appropriate.

■ Distracters

The incorrect alternatives in multiple-choice questions are called 'distracters', because their purpose is to distract the uninformed trainee from the correct response. The distracter must be realistic and should be based on misconceptions commonly held, or on mistakes commonly made.

The options "none of the above" or "all of the above" are used in some tests. These can be helpful, but should be used sparingly.

Distracters should distract the uninformed, but they should not take the form of 'trick' questions that could mislead the knowledgeable trainee (for example, do not insert "not" into a correct response to make it a distracter).

■ Scoring

A more sophisticated scoring technique entails awarding one mark for a correct response, zero for a nil response and minus one for an incorrect response. Where a multiple-choice test involves four alternatives, this means that a totally uninformed guess involves a 25% chance of gaining one mark and a 75% chance of losing one mark.

Scores can be weighted to reflect the relative importance of questions, or of sections of an evaluation.



Annex I


MSC.1/Circ.1334

**Piracy and armed robbery against ships –
Guidance to shipowners and ship operators,
shipmasters and crews on preventing and
suppressing acts of piracy and
armed robbery against ships**



MSC.1/Circ.1334 of 23 June 2009

- 1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eighty-sixth session (27 May to 5 June 2009), approved a revised MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 (Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews for preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships) as given at annex.
- 2 The revision was carried out on the basis of the outcome of the comprehensive review of the guidance provided by the Organization for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships; and took into account the work of the correspondence group on the review and updating of MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1, MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 and resolution A.922(22), established by MSC 84.
- 3 Member Governments and organizations in consultative status with IMO are recommended to bring this circular to the attention of shipowners, ship operators, shipping companies, shipmasters and crews and all other parties concerned.
- 4 This circular revokes MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3.



ANNEX

GUIDANCE TO SHIPOWNERS, COMPANIES¹, SHIP OPERATORS, SHIPMASTERS AND CREWS ON PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING ACTS OF PIRACY² AND ARMED ROBBERY³ AGAINST SHIPS

Introduction

1 This circular aims at bringing to the attention of shipowners, companies, ship operators masters and crews the precautions to be taken to reduce the risks of piracy on the high seas and armed robbery against ships at anchor, off ports or when underway through a coastal State's territorial waters. It outlines steps that should be taken to reduce the risk of such attacks, possible responses to them and the vital need to report attacks, both successful and unsuccessful, to the authorities of the relevant coastal State and to the ships' own maritime Administration. Such reports are to be made as soon as possible, to enable necessary action to be taken.

2 It is important to bear in mind that shipowners, companies, ship operators, masters and crews can and should take measures to protect themselves and their ships from pirates and armed robbers. While security forces can often advise on these measures, and flag States are required to take such measures as are necessary to ensure that owners and masters accept their responsibility, ultimately it is the responsibility of shipowners, companies, ship operators, masters and ship operators to take seamanlike precautions when their ships navigate in areas where the threat of piracy and armed robbery exists. Planning should give consideration to the crew's welfare during and after a period of captivity by pirates or armed robbers. Before operating in waters where attacks have been known to occur, it is imperative for shipowners, companies, ship operator and masters concerned to gather accurate information on the situation in the area. To this end the information on attacks and attempted attacks gathered, analysed and distributed by the IMO, IMB's Piracy Reporting

¹ The term "company" is defined in SOLAS regulations IX/1 and XI-2/1.

² The following definition of piracy is contained in Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101):

"Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

- (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
 - (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
 - (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
- (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
- (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)."

³ The Subregional meeting on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea area, held in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, from 14 to 18 April 2008, agreed to modify this definition. Consistent with the ReCAAP Agreement, the "private ends" motive has been added to the definition. The formulation "within internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea" replaced "within a State's jurisdiction". The new formulation reflects the views of France, supported by other States participating in the meeting, that the definition for armed robbery against ships should not be applicable to acts committed seaward of the territorial sea. The new definition reads: "Armed robbery against ships" means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.

Centre and the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC)¹, the Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, Governments and others is vital information, upon which precautionary measures should be based.

3 These recommendations have been culled from a number of sources. Where conflicting advice has been apparent, the reason for choosing the recommended course has been stated.

The pirates'/robbers' objective

4 In addition to the hijacking of ships and the holding of the crew hostage, and the theft of cargo, other targets of the attackers include cash in the ship's safe, crew possessions and any portable ship's equipment. When there has been evidence of tampering with containers, it may be an indication that the raiders may initially have gained access when the ship was berthed in port and then gone over the side, with what they could carry. The application of the ISPS Code is an important precautionary measure and a thorough checking of ships' compartments and securing them before leaving ports is therefore strongly encouraged.

Reducing the temptation for piracy and armed robbery

Cash in the ship's safe

5 The belief that large sums of cash are carried in the master's safe attracts attackers. In some cases this belief has been justified and sums have been stolen. While carrying cash may sometimes be necessary to meet operational needs and crew requirements and to overcome exchange control restrictions in some States, it acts as a magnet for attackers and they will intimidate and take hostage the master or crew members until the locations have been revealed. Shipowners should consider ways of eliminating the need to carry large sums of cash on board a ship. When this need arises because of exchange control restrictions imposed by States, the matter should be referred to the ship's maritime Administration to consider if representations should be made to encourage a more flexible approach as part of the international response to eliminate attacks by pirates and armed robbers.

Discretion by masters and members of the crew

6 Masters should bear in mind the possibility that attackers are monitoring ship-to-shore communications and using intercepted information to select their targets. Masters should however also be aware that switching off AIS in high-risk areas reduces ability of the supporting naval vessels to track and trace vessels which may require assistance. Caution should also be exercised when transmitting information on cargo or valuables on board by radio in areas where attacks occur.

7 It is up to the master's professional judgement to decide whether the AIS system should be switched off, in order for the ship not to be detected, when entering areas where piracy is an imminent threat, however the master should balance the risk of attack against the need to

¹ The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a Government-to-Government Agreement that addresses the incidence of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The status of ReCAAP ISC is an IGO. Further details may be found at www.recaap.org.

maintain the safety of navigation and, in particular, the requirements of COLREG Rule 7 on Risk of collision, and should act in accordance with the guidance in resolutions A.917(22) and A.956(23). The master should also be aware that other ships operating in high-risk areas may have taken a decision to switch off the AIS system. In the event of an attack, masters should ensure to the extent feasible that AIS is turned on again and transmitting to enable security forces to locate the vessel.

8 Members of the crew going ashore in ports in affected areas should be advised not to discuss the voyage or cargo particulars with persons unconnected with the ship's business.

Smaller crews

9 The smaller crew numbers now found on board ships also favour the attacker. A small crew engaged in ensuring the safe navigation of their ship through congested or confined waters will have the additional onerous task of maintaining high levels of security surveillance for prolonged periods. Shipowners may wish to consider enhancing security watches if their ship is in waters or at anchor off ports, where attacks occur. Shipowners may wish to consider providing appropriate surveillance and detection equipment to aid their crews and protect their ships.

Recommended practices

10 The recommended practices outlined below are based on reports of incidents, advice published by commercial organizations and measures developed to enhance ship security. The extent to which the recommendations are followed or applied are matters solely for the owners or masters of ships operating in areas where attacks occur. The shipping industry would also benefit from consulting other existing recommendations, including those given by the ReCAAP ISC¹, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, BIMCO, ICS and other industry bodies.

11 Given that the masters are often required to follow multiple reporting procedures in these difficult circumstances, it is necessary to simplify these procedures as far as operationally feasible. It is therefore recommended that in the event of an occurrence masters should report all actual or attempted attacks of piracy and armed robbery or threats thereof, to:

- (i) the nearest RCC or regional piracy focal point where applicable (e.g., ReCAAP ISC in the Asian region²),
- (ii) the flag State, and
- (iii) the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre³.

12 The recommended actions are defined as phases related to any voyage in a piracy and armed robbery threat area. The phases define the main stages in all situations of pre-piracy or armed robbery, attempted piracy or armed robbery and confirmed piracy or armed robbery.

¹ The ReCAAP ISC collates and analyses information concerning piracy and armed robbery against ships, and publishes regular reports which identify patterns and trends, highlight good practices and recommend preventive measures.

² See Appendices 1 and 2 to this circular regarding the information-sharing and incident-reporting processes generally and in the Asian region.

³ The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre is manned 24 hours a day and set up to receive and promulgate reports of attacks or attempted attacks worldwide.

13 Written procedures on how to prevent or suppress attacks of pirates and armed robbers should be found either in the ship's Safety Management System or in the ship security plan.

14 The entry into force of the ISPS Code and the ISM Code have made security assessments and risk assessments an integral part of the safety and security precautions. Measures to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships should be part of either the emergency response procedures in the safety management system, or as a situation that requires increased alertness, should become a part of the procedures in the ship security plan.

15 All ships operating in waters or ports where attacks occur should carry out a security assessment as a preparation for development of measures to prevent attacks of pirates or armed robbers against ships and on how to react should an attack occur. This should be included as a part of the emergency response procedures in the safety management system or a part of the procedures in the ship security plan. The security assessment should take into account the basic parameters of the operation including:

- .1 the risks that may be faced including any information given on characteristics of piracy or armed robbery in the specific area;
- .2 the ship's actual size, freeboard, maximum speed, and the type of cargo;
- .3 the number of crew members available, their proficiency and training;
- .4 the ability to establish secure areas on board ship; and
- .5 the equipment on board, including any surveillance and detection equipment that has been provided.

16 The ship security plan¹ or emergency response procedures should be prepared based on the risk assessment, detailing predetermined responses to address increases and decreases in threat levels.

The measures should, *inter alia*, cover:

- .1 the need for enhanced surveillance and the use of lighting, surveillance and detection equipment;
- .2 controlling of access to the ship and the restricted areas on the ships by ships' personnel, passengers, visitors, etc.;
- .3 prevention of unauthorized intrusion by active and passive devices and measures, such as netting, wire, electric fencing, long-range acoustic devices, as well as the use, when appropriate, of security personnel on vessels transiting high-risk areas, and taking other measures to make it more difficult for pirates to board vessels. The safety of onboard personnel should always be taken into account when installing passive devices on board and awareness information should be provided;

¹ Guidance can be found in the ISPS Code.