

NATIONAL CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS

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Date: 03 March 2012

SIGNALS PASSED AT DANGER

1 PURPOSE

1.1 The Network Rail Route Control is responsible for making sure that:

- each "Signal Passed at Danger" (SPAD) incident is responded to promptly
- the level of response required by the incident response matrix (as defined locally) is adhered to
- the incident is escalated to Senior Managers as required.

2 REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

<u>NR/L3/OCS/041</u>	Operations Manual
<u>GE/RT8000</u>	Rule Book
<u>NR/L1/OPS/010</u>	Signals Passed at Danger and Signal Reversions
<u>NR/L2/OPS/035</u>	Dissemination of Urgent Operating Advice
<u>GO/RT3119</u>	Accident and Incident Investigation
<u>NR/L3/INV/3001/RIM205</u>	Network Rail Led Investigations

3 SIGNALS PASSED AT DANGER – GENERAL

3.1 Table of Definitions

ERTMS	European Rail Traffic Management System
RU	Railway Undertaking (i.e TOCs / FOCs)
SPAD	Signals Passed At Danger The term used to describe an incident when a train has passed a STOP signal at DANGER without authority. SPAD's are categorised as follows:
Category	Description (Notes: No degree of severity or importance is implied within or between these categories).
A	A1 When a SPAD has occurred and, according to available evidence, a stop aspect, indication or end of in-cab signalled movement authority was displayed or given correctly and in sufficient time for the train to be stopped safely at it.

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	When a SPAD has occurred and, according to available evidence, the stop aspect, indication or end of in-cab signalled movement authority concerned was not displayed or given correctly, but was preceded by the correct aspects or indications.
	<p>A3</p> <p>When a SPAD has occurred and, according to available evidence, verbal and / or visual permission to pass a signal at danger was given by a hand signaller or other authorised person without the authority of the signaller.</p>
	<p>A4</p> <p>When a SPAD has occurred and, according to available evidence, a stop aspect, indication or end of in-cab signalled movement authority was displayed or given correctly and in sufficient time for the train to be stopped safely at it, but the train driver was unable to stop his train owing to circumstances beyond his control (for example, poor rail head adhesion, train braking equipment failure or malfunction etc).</p>
B	<p>B1</p> <p>When a SPAD has occurred because a stop aspect, indication or end of in-cab signalled movement authority, that previously showed a proceed indication, was displayed because of infrastructure failure (for example, signalling or level crossing equipment has failed or malfunctioned).</p>
	<p>B2</p> <p>When a SPAD has occurred because a stop aspect, indication or end of in-cab signalled movement authority, that previously showed a proceed indication, was displayed because it was returned to danger or displayed in error.</p>
C	When a SPAD has occurred because a stop aspect, indication or end of in-cab signalled movement authority was not displayed in sufficient time for the train to be stopped safely at the signal, indication or end of in-cab signalled movement authority as it had been returned to danger automatically or in an emergency in accordance with GE/RT8000 Rule Book.
D	When a SPAD has occurred because vehicles without any traction unit attached, or a train which is unattended, had run away past the signal at danger or without an in-cab movement authority.

3.2

The following procedure ensures that each Signal Passed at Danger is managed in a way which prevents increased or new risks, as well as ensuring that they are investigated thoroughly to establish the root cause and prevent reoccurrence.