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GE/GN8571
Guidance on Proceed-on-Sight Authorities
Issue Two: December 2011
Rail Industry Guidance Note for GE/RT8071

Guidance on Proceed-on-Sight Authorities

Issue record

Issue	Date	Comments
One	February 2006	Original document
Two	December 2011	Issue two of GE\GN8571 has been published to support GE/RT8071 issue two.

Revisions have not been marked by a vertical black line in this issue because the document has been revised throughout.

Superseded documents

The following Railway Group documents are superseded, either in whole or in part as indicated:

Superseded documents	Sections superseded	Date when sections are superseded
GE/GN8571, issue one, Guidance on Control Facilities for use during Lineside Signalling Failures	All	03 March 2012

GE/GN8571, issue one, Guidance on Control Facilities for use during Lineside Signalling Failures, ceases to be in force and is withdrawn as of 03 March 2012.

Supply

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Guidance on Proceed-on-Sight Authorities

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Guidance on Proceed-on-Sight Authorities

Part 1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose of this document

- 1.1.1 This document gives guidance on interpreting the requirements of Railway Group Standard GE/RT8071, issue two, Proceed-on-Sight Authorities. It does not constitute a recommended method of meeting any set of mandatory requirements.
- 1.1.2 All requirements in GE/RT8071 are reproduced in the sections that follow. Guidance is provided as a series of sequentially numbered clauses prefixed 'GN' immediately below the text to which it relates. Where there is no guidance given, this is stated.
- 1.1.3 Specific responsibilities and compliance requirements are laid down in the Railway Group Standard itself.

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1.3 Approval and authorisation of this document

- 1.3.1 The content of this document was approved by Control Command and Signalling Standards Committee on 21 July 2011.
- 1.3.2 This document was authorised by RSSB on 01 August 2011.

1.4 Background

- GN1 'Signal failures' are relatively infrequent and are often the manifestation of problems with the body of the railway infrastructure for which signalling acts essentially as the 'nervous system'. Although designed to be 'fail-safe', the consequences of failure to obtain movement authorities for trains can give rise to significant secondary hazards, particularly due to the operating procedures at present in use for signals having to be passed at danger. These can include:
- a) Route not set properly (points run through; train mounted).
 - b) Misunderstanding between signaller, handsignaller and driver (extent of movement authority or line examination; direction of travel).
 - c) Passenger unrest, due to cumulative delay to trains (passengers leaving trains not at a platform).
 - d) Passenger discomfort, due to extended stoppage.