

CAA Response to AAIB Recommendation 2015-047



Requirement

Following the tragic accident involving Hunter G-BXFI at the Shoreham airshow in 2015, the CAA was required to complete a number of actions in response to 31 AAIB Recommendations. One of the recommendations was:

Safety Recommendation 2015-047

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review its procedures to ensure that a 'Permit to Fly-Certificate of Validity' is valid when it is issued.

The CAA response to AAIB 2015-047 was:

CAA Response

Responsibility for ensuring that a 'Permit to Fly-Certificate of Validity' is valid when issued sits with the approved maintenance organisation and not the CAA. An organisation approved by the CAA to conduct an airworthiness review on such aircraft is granted the privilege, under its approval, to declare to the CAA that a particular aircraft complies with the requirements of BCAR Section A Chapter A3-7, which includes completing a physical survey of the aircraft and a documented review of its records to determine its airworthiness status. The CAA is not required to validate the work carried out under this approval before a Certificate of Validity is issued. Instead, an organisation's compliance with these requirements, including the adequacy of declarations, is audited as part of CAA's continued oversight activity.

Therefore, in order to deliver the intent of this Safety Recommendation, the CAA will review both the design and implementation of its oversight activity in respect of approved maintenance organisations and the process by which documents such as Permit to Fly Certificates of Validity are issued by approved organisations.

By April 2018, the CAA will conclude this review, and, should any changes be necessary, identify the date by which they will be implemented.

Since the recommendation was made, the CAA has:

- Reviewed the elements of the regulatory framework.
- Performed unscheduled audits of the implementation system.
- Identified specific changes in both the design and implementation of its oversight activity to improve the integrity of the system

As a result of this review the following changes to improve the integrity of the design of the system have been implemented:

1. Personnel responsible for the Airworthiness Review and issue of the C of V for ex-military types will be specifically authorised by the CAA for the purpose (previously authorised within the organisation).

2. Organisations approved to carry out Airworthiness Review and issue of the C of V of ex-military types will have to define and detail, within their expositions, the procedures for managing Ministry of Defence Airworthiness Processes (e.g. MOD Form 700 Series) where applicable.

As a result of this review the following changes to improve the oversight of the system have been implemented:

1. The oversight activity of A8-25 Organisations responsible for the Airworthiness Review and issue of the C of V in general will be considered as a standalone, focused task, independent of any applicable continued airworthiness or maintenance approval.
2. All A8-25 Organisations responsible for the Airworthiness Review and issue of the C of V for ex-military types will be considered as “high-complexity” organisations within the CAA Oversight Matrix regardless of performance based indicators or proportionality measures for the foreseeable future.
3. All A8-25 Organisations responsible for the Airworthiness Review and issue of the C of V for ex-military types will be audited sequentially to establish a uniform standard of airworthiness management and personnel.